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As rates of cohabitation rise, and marriage becomes a status reserved
almost exclusively for socio-economic elites, the scholarly calls for family
law to recognize more nonmarital families grow stronger by the day. This
Article unpacks contemporary proposals to recognize more nonmarital
families and juxtaposes those proposals with family law’s contemporary
marital regime. Family law’s status-based system provides a mostly simple
and efficient means of distributing resources at the end of a marriage by
imposing a formulaic, but distinctly communitarian, non-market-based ap-
proach to obligation, entitlement, and value. In full, the Article defends
family law’s status-based system for what it does well, including dispensing
with invasive inquiries into financial and sexual relationships, rejecting
gendered market-based measures of recovery, and imposing communitar-
ian obligations that can be efficiently enforced. It also acknowledges that
this system leaves a growing class of people unprotected, but it suggests that
many of those people, particularly low-income women of color, may want
to be left out. The taxonomy provided in this Article should help scholars
and legislators endeavoring to grapple with when it is appropriate to treat
nonmarital couples as some kind of family. First, the nonmarriage propos-
als that impose communitarian obligations on cohabiting couples reject
market-based measures of recovery but inflict categorization costs, which
are invasive judicial inquiries into people’s financial and sexual practices.
These proposals also may conscript those who can least afford, and have
legitimate reasons to reject, communitarian obligations. Second, the non-
marriage proposals that do the best job of disrupting family law’s binary
status system, while they respect the autonomy of those who do not want
family law imposed on them against their wishes, run the risk of leaving
those left vulnerable by the interdependencies of relationship with nothing.
Finally, the proposals that suggest dispensing with most of family law and
just relying on common law doctrines of contract and unjust enrichment
inevitably incorporate gendered, neoliberal understandings of desert and
reward because that is how the market assigns value. For those who want
to reject a neoliberal approach to reward and obligation, there are benefits
to family law exceptionalism and the much-maligned idea of seeing the
family as the market’s opposite.
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I. INTRODUCTION
WITH the battle for same-sex marriage won, much legal scholar-ship has turned its attention from those who want to marry tothose who don’t, either because marriage does not make sense
for them at various times or because they affirmatively shun the institu-
tion. Given the explosion of people who now live together in conjugal
relationships and share intimate tasks, economic responsibilities, and
caretaking—often with children—it is no surprise that so much attention
is being paid to these relationships. In an effort to make family law more
inclusive in communities in which marriage is rare, and for individuals
who want to reject marriage, there are multiple calls for the law to recog-
nize “nonmarital families,”1 “nonmarriage,”2 and “kinship structures.”3
Legal recognition of relationships other than marriage also has the poten-
tial to disrupt “marriage as the measure of all things.”4
But what is a nonmarital family, nonmarriage, or a kinship structure?
Those calling for the law to recognize alternative families must realize
that before the law can recognize those entities it has to decide what they
are. What makes two or more people a family? That they have sex with
each other? (How often? Need it be monogamous? And why does that
matter?) That they share a home? (What if there are “nonfamily” mem-
bers in the home also? What if there are two homes, and the movement
between them is fluid? And what does household have to do with fam-
ily?) That they share their money and labor? (How much sharing is
enough? What counts as labor?) That they are committed to each other?
(Measured how? By whom? Must it be mutual?) The law ceased asking
these questions of married people long ago. The answer to the question,
“Are you a family?” is answered by reference to your marital status.
Numerous critics assail the law’s binary treatment of family status—
married or not married—but the binary treatment of marital status has
benefits not only for people who marry but also for everyone who wants
to minimize the state’s role in prescribing and judging intimate behavior.
Because so much turns on marital status, not the actual behavior of the
parties, marriage affords married people protection from invasive state
inquiries into their sex lives, their living arrangements, their interpersonal
conduct, and much of their financial decision-making. It is not clear that
it will be possible to incorporate non-normative families into family law
1. See Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital
Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167 (2015); Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitu-
tion of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2015).
2. See Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2017);
Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97 B.U. L. REV.
425 (2017).
3. See Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 1207 (2016).
4. Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2686
(2008).
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without bringing back that which contemporary family law has effectively
banished: moralistic inquiries about what kind of love and care are wor-
thy of recognition, subjective understandings of the value of intimate care
work, and necessarily normative inquiries about sexual conduct.
Moreover, there are sound reasons why many people may wish to live
without the law’s protection of their alternative family. Contemporary
family law imposes a set of rights and obligations on those with marital
status. Those rights and obligations can create unacceptable constraints
and complicated problems for people with little wealth and social stabil-
ity. The costs of being recognized as family for purposes of family law
may well outweigh the benefits. If that is the case, then the numerous
calls for greater recognition of nonmarital families, especially for low-in-
come couples, are somewhat misplaced. It is not family law that low-in-
come people need; it is money, education, health care, and the means to
acquire the economic security that makes family law relevant.
This Article unpacks contemporary attempts to recognize more
nonmarital families. It assesses the costs and benefits of different regimes,
including conduct-based (opt-out) systems, which involve judicial evalua-
tion of whether a couple should be treated as married for purposes of the
law; intent-based (opt-in) systems, which involve individual couples
choosing to opt in to the rules that they want to govern their relationship;
and more traditional common law and equitable alternatives to family
law rules, like contract and unjust enrichment.
Part II of the Article sets the stage for the comparative analysis by
briefly describing the simplicity with which the current status-based fam-
ily law system assigns rights and responsibilities within marital families.5
Though easily critiqued as too binary and formalistic, contemporary fam-
ily law imposes a set of rights and obligations that are efficiently applied.
Family law measures compensation only at dissolution of the family
group and by reference to what the combined collective can provide. It is
a distinctly communitarian, non-liberal, non-market-based approach to
obligation, entitlement, and value. One is entitled because one has status,
not because one earned it, and what one is obligated for is a function of
what one has, not how the market values another’s services.
Part III then introduces the problem of defining which people, other
than those with marital status, the law may need to recognize and protect.
Though the calls for greater recognition of nonmarital families seem
ubiquitous, there are clear differences in why scholars think alternative
“families” need to be recognized. Yet, why a couple may need access to
redress or recognition affects the kind of redress they need. Com-
5. This Article uses the term “family law” to refer to a broad set of legal rights and
obligations that attach to people who have family status—particularly marital status. Fam-
ily law’s determination of who has that status has implications for other areas of law as
well, including government benefits, intestacy, and standing for various common law
causes of action. This Article does not attempt a complete categorization of all the ramifi-
cations of family law status, nor does it suggest that all the ways other areas of law rely on
family status are appropriate.
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pounding this problem is what the demographic data underscores about
those who cohabit: cohabitants are far from a monolithic group, and they
cohabit for many different reasons, some rejecting marriage for ideologi-
cal reasons, some for economic reasons, some merely waiting until they
are ready to marry. Part III highlights the diversity in the scholarship call-
ing for nonmarital recognition and the diversity in the population that
might be recognized.
The heart of the Article is in Parts IV and V, which lay out the main
differences between the recent attempts to augment family law’s status-
based system. Part IV.A explores conduct-based regimes. Traditionally
called common law marriage, but now often labeled “domestic partner-
ship” or “committed relationship,” these regimes impose the rights and
obligations of marriage on cohabitants based on whether a court finds
that the couple lived in a committed, interdependent relationship. Unless
such a couple explicitly opts out of family law treatment, conduct-based
regimes impose family law rules on a couple based on their conduct.
Evaluations of how these regimes work in practice highlight what this
Article refers to as categorization costs: expensive, invasive, and usually
moralistic inquiries into parties’ financial and sexual arrangements to de-
termine whether a couple should be categorized as committed and inter-
dependent. Inevitably, courts also assess the interdependence of a
nonmarital relationship by comparing it to the only referent they know:
marriage. Part IV.B shows how conduct-based proposals, though de-
signed to help the vulnerable, may impose obligations on those who do
not want and can least afford them, especially when children are present.
Part V then turns to the main alternatives to conduct-based, opt-out
systems: registration (opt-in) systems and traditional common law and
equitable remedies. Part V.A shows how registration systems, regimes
that require a couple to opt in to the rules that they want the law to apply
to their relationship, do a slightly better job of disrupting marital norms
and a much better job of respecting parties’ autonomy than do opt-out
systems, but couples who opt into a nonmarital legal regime almost uni-
formly opt into neoliberal regimes that emphasize individual ownership
and market-based assessments of value. Opt-in regimes undermine family
law’s binary status-based system, but they also undermine the communi-
tarian values that determine entitlement and obligation in family law.
Part V.B explores the potential of common law remedies—like explicit
and implicit contract—and equitable remedies—like constructive trust
and unjust enrichment—to do justice to cohabitants if opt-out and opt-in
systems cannot. The analysis suggests that, in practice, the benefits and
challenges of contract actions parallel almost perfectly the benefits and
challenges of opt-out and opt-in systems. A finding of implicit contract,
like a finding of domestic partnership, is likely only after an invasive in-
quiry in which a judge finds that a couple behaved as married people do.
Explicit contracts, on the other hand, function as opt-in systems, working
only when parties take the time to detail what they want the rights and
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obligations of their relationship to be. When they do so, couples usually
contract out of the communitarian non-market-based approach to obliga-
tion that family law imposes.
Unjust enrichment and constructive trust claims, because they are not
nearly as reliant on marriage as a referent, discourage courts from invok-
ing marital norms. But by doing so, these doctrines also eschew the com-
munitarian non-liberal approach to valuation. Scholars rightly identify
that courts are bad at even seeing the kinds of relational investments
(care work, housework) that women often make in these claims. But the
market is not much, if any, better. Thus, even if courts did recognize wo-
men’s investments, they would inevitably undervalue them, in part be-
cause the market undervalues women’s labor (this is the comparable
worth problem) and in part because so much of intimate care work is
unique. It has no market value.
The Article concludes by defending family law’s status-based system
for what it does well: dispensing with invasive inquiries into financial and
sexual relationships, rejecting gendered market-based measures of recov-
ery, and imposing communitarian obligations that can be efficiently en-
forced. It acknowledges that this system leaves a growing class of people
unprotected, but it suggests that many of those people may want to be
left out. The Article does not conclude that the various alternative
frameworks for treating cohabitation are fatally flawed or unnecessary.
Given the growing number of people who choose to live outside of mar-
riage, some legal response in some situations is almost certainly appropri-
ate. But which regime best fits which context is a much harder question.
This Article provides a taxonomy that should help judges and legislatures
endeavoring to grapple with that question.
II. STATUS-BASED FAMILY LAW
A. ECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTION AT DISSOLUTION
BASED ON FAMILY STATUS
In the second half of the twentieth century, as the norms around sex,
reproduction, and intimacy grew less uniform, family law grew more uni-
form. Justice O’Connor wrote at the turn of the century that “[t]he demo-
graphic changes of the [twentieth] century make it difficult to speak of an
average American family,”6 but contemporary family law is all about
averages and norms. Child support is determined based on the average
marginal cost of a child for a two-parent household.7 Individual, non-nor-
mative living and spending patterns of potential obligors are irrelevant.
Marital property division is rooted in a very strong norm that sets a base-
6. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
7. This Article is mostly about marital status, not parental status, so child support
may seem beside the point, but the move to formulae for child support is a critical part of
the twentieth century family law story. It was by implementing child support formulae,
which worked so much more efficiently and effectively than the previous discretionary
systems, that family law grew so enamored of formulae.
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line of equal (50/50) division of all property earned during the marriage,
regardless of who earned what or how. Post-marital support (also known
as alimony or maintenance) is increasingly determined by formulae
adopted by legislatures that base awards on the length of the marriage
and post-marital income differential, not on what an individual spouse
may have earned or sacrificed through her contribution.
These formulas are easily critiqued.8 The two-parent, same-household
norm on which child support is based is not, in fact, a norm for most
children in this country.9 The 50/50 rule for marital property suggests a
unity and a shared economic purpose that stands in contrast to the Su-
preme Court’s celebrated finding that “the marital couple is not an inde-
pendent entity . . . but an association of two individuals each with a
separate intellectual and emotional makeup.”10 The recent emergence of
formulae for maintenance are rooted not in any reason or theory but in
the past practices of judges.11 Their goal is to eliminate the relevance of
context in order to bring consistency and therefore predictability.
The formulaic approach to family obligation is also relatively new. For
years, the laws of child support, property division, and alimony were ex-
ceedingly discretionary. As I have previously described, the move to uni-
formity in law came as even the semblance of uniformity in life
disintegrated.12 And, critically, the two trends are related. The more va-
ried peoples’ actual intimate lives are, the harder it is to determine what
kinds of obligations intimates owe each other.13 So family law gave up on
individualized assessments and moved to formulas. It did this not long
after having given up on individualized assessments of even more per-
sonal inquiries involving fault in divorce. Judges wanted no part in serious
8. One legal expert on child support explains that the data that underlies all child
support determinations “is empirically unverifiable, theoretically questionable, and
[based] . . . upon flawed [inputs].” Ira Mark Ellman, Fudging Failure: The Economic Anal-
ysis Used to Construct Child Support Guidelines, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 167, 215 (2004).
9. More than 50% of children are expected to live without two parents in the house-
hold for at least part of their childhood. Many children never live with two parents and
even more live with two parents only for a limited time. See generally Sheela Kennedy &
Larry Bumpass, Cohabitation and Children’s Living Arrangements: New Estimates from the
United States, 19 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 1663 (2008).
10. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The notion of marital unity is often
traced to Blackstone: “By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: . . . [the]
legal existence of the woman . . . is incorporated and consolidated into that of the hus-
band . . . .” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
11. See SCOTT R. STEVENSON & JUSTIN L. KELSEY, THE DIVORCE SPOUSAL SUPPORT
CALCULATOR: AN ALIMONY FORMULA RESOURCE 11–13 (2010) (describing how the ali-
mony formulae used by Massachusetts judges were developed based on past awards); see
also Ira Mark Ellman, Reorganizing the Family, the Maturing Law of Divorce Finances:
Toward Rules and Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 801, 811–13 (1999) (describing the Maricopa
County, Arizona commission’s charge to develop guidelines to reflect current awards, not
define what alimony should be).
12. See generally Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families:
The Standardization of Family Law When There is No Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L.
REV. 319 (2012).
13. See id.
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assessments of adultery, cruelty, and sexual desertion.14
For instance, the obligation to support children used to be tied to fam-
ily context, like whether the parents had been married, and subjective
understandings of need. As marriage became less ubiquitous, and more
and more children were born to unmarried mothers, a marriage-based
system of child support grew untenable. There was no coherent way of
addressing need when so many children from so many different economic
strata were the subject of child support actions. The variety of living situa-
tions into which children were born made the law less willing to accom-
modate context, not more. Congress now requires all states to apply
formulas that are based on estimations of the average amount of money a
normative two-parent family would spend on a child if the two parents
lived together.15 In other words, the response to all of the people who
had and raised children while living outside a marital-like relationship
was to treat them as if they were living in a marital-like relationship and
assign responsibility accordingly.
The advantage of this imposed normativity is that formulae provide a
ready answer to the question of how much one should pay in child sup-
port without having to evaluate context at all. A parent is obligated be-
cause he is a parent, and what he owes is a question of what he has.
Situational fairness takes a back seat to the formula in order to facilitate
the distribution of resources to children.
In the last twenty-five years, that same preference for efficiency over
context has taken hold of property division and spousal support. Context
is now largely irrelevant for questions of property division. In the forty-
one non-community property states, the law used to pay much more at-
tention to who owned what in a marriage and how marital wealth was
created. Women often ended up with very little property at divorce—
though courts sometimes tried to alleviate women’s hardship by granting
them discretionary spousal support. The contemporary move to a very
strong presumption of an equal division of all wealth and debt accumu-
lated during the marriage (which is also the community property model)
provides much more protection for non-market participants, but it also
renders irrelevant many questions that could seem important. What if
one party chose not to contribute economically when the other party
wanted her to? What if the party who earned the most money also did
most of the household labor? What justifies treating a spouse who con-
tributed thousands of hours of non-market work to a household the same
as a spouse who hired others to do that work, pursued her own non-re-
14. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical
Perspective, 63 OR. L. REV. 649, 662–67 (1984) (explaining the judicial abandonment of
fault determinations during divorce).
15. Congress wanted to make sure that unwed mothers who were potential welfare
recipients got more child support than judges traditionally awarded. See Baker, supra note
12, at 329 (explaining congressional action in 1984 and 1988 that required states to develop
child support guidelines if they wanted access to federal programs designed to help low
income children).
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munerative interests, or just did nothing? In contemporary family law,
none of those questions matter. What matters is that the parties were
married. Marital status defines the existence of obligation, and the wealth
accumulated determines the content of the obligation.
The same kind of analysis now applies to post-marital support. The
move towards formulae in spousal support allows courts to ignore a host
of invasive and moralistic inquiries, including what counts as contribution
to a marriage, what economic opportunities a spouse forewent and why,
what the expectations of the parties were with regard to money or sex,
and how sexual performance, adultery, cruelty, or emotional distance af-
fected those expectations. With today’s formulae, if one was married long
enough, and there is significant income differential post-divorce, one is
entitled to post-marital support.
These formulae allow family law to define dependency—whether of
children or spouses—relatively, with reference to what the collective can
provide or has provided. This means that in couples who marry, family
law forces a higher earning spouse to share with a lower earning spouse,
regardless of their relative non-market contributions to the collective. At
times, this may seem odd or unjust, but it is a compromise that family law
has grown comfortable with because judges and legislatures have deter-
mined that it is easier to have bright-line rules and formulae than to do
granular evaluations of entitlement for each divorcing couple. The for-
mulaic approach to entitlement in family law reflects a trade-off. Individ-
ual property settlements and maintenance awards are unlikely to
accurately assess entitlement in any given case, but the couple and the
court system avoid the invasive assessment of how the couple structured
their financial and emotional lives.
The consistency provided by the over- and underinclusive formulae
also facilitates parties’ understandings of their rights and obligations.
Simplicity and transparency are particularly important to a legal regime
that relies on settlements.16 In family law, there is no corporate wealth to
finance litigation, few repeat players willing to fight for legal principles,
and little taste for litigation among the class of people subject to marital
dissolution laws. The vast majority of divorcing couples want to get in and
out of the legal system quickly.17 The clarity of the family law system
facilitates the bargaining that happens in its shadow.18
B. COMMON LAW RIGHTS AND FAMILY STATUS
Family status also affects the legal rights of individuals at times other
than at dissolution of the relationship. The common law traditionally both
16. Aaron Thomas, What Types of Divorces Typically Go to Trial?, LAWYERS.COM
(Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/family-law/divorce/what-types-of-di-
vorces-typically-go-to-trial.html [https://perma.cc/3NDH-A7TZ] (estimating that over 90%
of divorces settle without trial).
17. See id.
18. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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restricted and granted certain rights based on marital status. For instance,
the doctrine of marital unity prohibited spouses from suing each other in
contract or tort. Because husband and wife were construed as having “be-
come one” in marriage, a contract or tort action between spouses was
barred as a suit against self.19
Much of the marital unity doctrine has been rejected today. Courts are
far more willing to see two people who are married to each other as sepa-
rate individuals. All states now allow spouses to sue each other in tort,
and most states allow some contract actions between spouses.20 Still, con-
tract actions that might supplement family law rights are rarely en-
forced.21 In part, this is because the totality of a marital relationship is
thought to include sex, and courts will not enforce contracts for sex. In
part, though, the reticence to enforce contracts stems from the alterna-
tives that are available to married people.
Family members are often the only ones who can presumptively sue for
certain torts, like intentional infliction of emotional distress or loss of
consortium. The gravamen of these torts stems from the emotional harm
the law is willing to recognize in some relationships but not others. Family
status allows one to sue for the loss of one’s spouse even though one
cannot sue for the loss of one’s best friend. Surely, there are instances in
which the loss of one’s best friend is more traumatic, but the law draws
the line for economic recovery at family status. Thus, family status giveth
standing to sue for compensation for torts, even while it taketh away
some spouses’ ability to sue each other in contract.
C. OTHER RAMIFICATIONS OF FAMILY STATUS
Far more salient for most married people than common law rights in
tort or contract are the thousand ways in which marital status affects
one’s presumed, or actual, eligibility for various government entitle-
ments.22 Intestacy and tax law are two of the most obvious areas in which
family status matters, but a plethora of public and private social welfare
programs also rely on family status to determine entitlement. For in-
stance, it is only family members who can collect on another person’s
Social Security or workers’ compensation account. Access to other social
19. See supra note 10 (providing Blackstone’s definition of the unity doctrine). The
canonical modern application of this doctrine is Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993), in which the court refused to enforce an alleged oral contract be-
tween two spouses for lack of consideration because the caretaking services promised in
the contract were already part of the marital bargain. For more on the doctrine regarding
interspousal contracts, see JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 70–82 (2014).
20. Most states enforce pre- and post-nuptial agreements, though they vary in the
scrutiny they apply to such contracts. See Hasday, supra note 19, at 75–82.
21. See id. at 67–94 (discussing courts’ reticence to use contract to regulate economic
exchange within the family).
22. In 1997, the Government Accounting Office identified 1,049 provisions in the
United States Code that conditioned rights and privileges on marital status. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO
PRIOR REPORT (2004).
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welfare benefits, administered largely through employers, is also often
presumptively limited to family members. Such benefits include health
insurance and expanded forms of disability, life, and retirement
insurance.23
It is clear, therefore, that family status does a prodigious amount of
work. Courts and administrators do not have to ask all the questions
raised in the introduction about when two people should be treated as
family, why they should be treated as family, and what that treatment
should entail. Those questions are answered by reference to the parties’
marital status. This has implications for spouses’ rights vis-á-vis each
other at dissolution and for legal entitlements from third parties, like the
state and private insurance programs. By relying on status, family law
allows all of these programs to avoid categorizing who counts as family.
Approximately 18 million couples in this country share resources,
homes, and/or children without availing themselves of family status, how-
ever.24 A system that relies so heavily on status leaves vast swaths of the
population out of family law’s orbit.
III. NONMARITAL FAMILIES
A. THE GROWING CALL FOR LEGAL RECOGNITION
Most scholars calling for family law to abandon its reliance on status in
order to reach more kinds of families and family relationships do not de-
fine what they mean by “family” with much specificity. Sometimes schol-
ars use the word family as a self-defining noun, suggesting that the word
family is not a legal term but a natural or extra-legal one.25 Other times,
scholars use the word family or familial as an adjective defining relation-
ship.26 This latter usage suggests that not all relationships are familial but
23. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights
and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2001)
(describing the expansion of these rights to same-sex partners); Kaiponanea T. Matsumura,
Beyond Property: The Other Legal Consequences of Informal Relationships, 51 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1325, 1338–46 (2019) (exploring employer-based benefit plans that allow an employee
to choose an added beneficiary, regardless of that beneficiary’s legal relationship to the
employee).
24. Renee Stepler, Number of U.S. Adults Cohabiting with a Partner Continues to Rise,
Especially Among Those 50 and Older, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/06/number-of-u-s-adults-cohabiting-with-a-partner-
continues-to-rise-especially-among-those-50-and-older/ [https://perma.cc/SWV6-3XU9].
25. For instance, Nancy Polikoff writes that the law must provide “those supports that
every family deserves.” NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 8 (2008); see also Joslin, supra note 2, at 473
(suggesting that nonmarital families have now joined “marital families” as the “building
block of our society,” without defining nonmarital family).
26. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collabora-
tion and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293 (speaking
of “family forms” that can be protected). Melissa Murray uses the word “nonmarital rela-
tionship,” presumably to refer to some kind of family relationship, unless she means to
classify all relationships in one of two categories: marital or not. Murray also uses the term
“kinship structure,” presumably using kinship as a substitute for family and structure as a
substitute for relationship. However, it is still not clear what makes a relationship
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that there is something non-legal that parties can do to transform a rela-
tionship into a familial one.
For sure, the term family has meaning outside the law. When the Pew
Research Center asks the public whether “an unmarried couple living to-
gether with no children [constitutes] a family,”27 respondents have some
understanding of what they are being asked. But Pew would be asking a
different question if it asked, “How should the law treat an unmarried
couple living together without children?” The fact that the public uses the
word “family” to describe a group of non-legally related individuals does
not necessarily mean either that the law should treat non-legally related
individuals as if they were legally related or that the law should treat
them any differently than individuals whom we would not consider “fa-
milial.” The content of the legal literature on nonmarital families suggests
that scholars are far more concerned with the question of what the law
should do about people who live without family status. The answer to that
question depends on why one thinks the law need get involved.
Thus, one way of determining how scholars are defining family is to
examine why they think the law should get involved in “nonmarital rela-
tionships” and “kinship structures.”28 Embedded in the reasons for why
the law need get involved in nonmarital relationships and kinship struc-
tures is often a definition of family. For instance, when Cynthia Bowman
argues that the law must come to the aid of those who are left vulnerable
by a cohabiting relationship in which the parties “merged their lives for a
period of time [and] develop[ed] relations of dependency,”29 she is, at
least in part, arguing that the family should be defined as those relation-
ships in which merged lives created conditions of dependence. When
other scholars focus on how some relationships provide “intangible goods
such as community, emotional support, and intimacy,”30 or “promote[ ]
care and interdependence,”31 or “recogniz[e] and support . . .
caregivers,”32 they are suggesting that family should be defined function-
ally. When individuals do those things that make a relationship familial,
the law should recognize them as such. Family is as family does.
Still others suggest that the law must recognize nonmarital relation-
ships because the institution of marriage is too exclusive and steeped in
nonmarital or one of kinship. See Murray, supra note 3, at 1257; Emily J. Stolzenberg, The
New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1983, 1985 (2018) (referring to “family
relationships”).
27. PEW RES. CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 14
(2010), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-
new-families/ [https://perma.cc/2B82-7TRZ].
28. Murray, supra note 3, at 1257.
29. CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3
(2010) (“Cohabitants who have merged their lives for a period of time develop relations of
dependency that leave them vulnerable when the union ends . . . .”).
30. Stolzenberg, supra note 26, at 2040.
31. Scott & Scott, supra note 26, at 361.
32. ROBIN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER 94 (2007).
2020] What is Nonmarriage? 213
patriarchy.33 By presenting such a rigidly binary status system—married
or not married—the law arguably enshrines marriage as the only legiti-
mate form of family and thus reifies marital supremacy.34 More options
for other forms of recognized family status would help disrupt marital
supremacy and the social and economic reification of marriage. As Robin
West explains, “Marriage makes us feel good, in part, because the state
and our community tell us we are good, by virtue of participating.”35 For
those who don’t marry, the communal celebration of marriage feels
harmful, punitive, and moralistic.36 Some scholars argue that the law
needs to recognize more kinds of relationships because only recognizing
marriage is sending unnecessary and harmful messages of exclusion.37
Finally, some scholars do try to define the relationships that need rec-
ognition but not why. When Professor Albertina Antognini critiques the
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges38 for leaving out “indi-
viduals that remain in the shadow of [the Court’s] decision because they
engage in sexual, affective, and economic relationships outside of mar-
riage,”39 she suggests that those who engage in sexual, affective, and eco-
nomic relationships deserve attention.40 But she does not explain why the
combination of those relationships requires distinct legal treatment.
Surely not all sexual, or affective, or economic relationships are familial.
Is the problem that the law treats those who engage in sexual, affective,
and economic relationships differently than it treats married people, or is
the problem that the law treats them the same as individuals who are not
engaging in sexual, affective, and economic relationships? Or is the prob-
lem that people cohabiting in that way deserve their own kind of legal
treatment that is neither marital nor completely nonfamilial? The com-
mentary is often obtuse on that issue.
The next section explores what demographers tell us about those most
likely to engage in sexual, affective, and economic relationships outside
of marriage.
B. THE GROWING CLASS OF PEOPLE WHO MAY BE RECOGNIZED
1. Who Cohabits
“Cohabitation is an increasingly prevalent lifestyle in the United
33. See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 619–20 (2013)
(describing the reasons many people may want to reject marriage because of its gendering
effects and patriarchal past).
34. Serena Mayeri probably deserves credit for coining the term, “marital supremacy.”
See Mayeri, supra note 1.
35. WEST, supra note 32, at 74.
36. Id. at 200.
37. Id.; Aloni, supra note 33.
38. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
39. Antognini, supra note 2, at 4.
40. Id.
214 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
States”41 and across the industrialized world.42 The U.S. Census Bureau
reports that between 2000 and 2010, the number of “unmarried couple
households” grew by 41.4%,43 and the Pew Research Center reports that
the rate of cohabitation has increased 29% since 2007.44 Pew also reports
that “35% of all unmarried parents are living with a partner.”45 Impor-
tantly though, these terms are not self-defining.46 The Census Bureau
asks people to identify household members who are “unmarried part-
ners,” but studies show different results if one asks instead, “Do you have
a boyfriend, girlfriend or partner in this household?”47 Unmarried “par-
ents” may be living with a partner, but that partner is not necessarily a
parent of the child in the household.48 More fundamentally, as Katharine
Silbaugh reminds us, “households and families are distinct.”49 Thus, much
of this data must be understood as including subjective understandings of
what “cohabitation,” “couple,” and “partner” mean.
All sorts of people—young, old, rich, poor, lovers, friends, acquaint-
ances—live together. Shared living space is especially common in urban
areas where housing costs are high50 and in low income communities
where resources are scarce.51 Roommate finding services have increased
the prevalence of unrelated people living together,52 and social norms
have broken down presumptions about conjugality when people live to-
gether. When scholars speak of nonmarital couples they presumably are
not speaking about roommates, but it is not necessarily clear what conju-
gality has to do with how the law should classify a relationship or when,
41. Richard Fry & D’Vera Cohn, Living Together: The Economics of Cohabitation,
PEW RES. CTR. (June 27, 2011), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/06/27/living-to-
gether-the-economics-of-cohabitation/ [https://perma.cc/NSB2-ZKGJ].
42. Marcia J. Carlson, Families Unequal: Socioeconomic Gradients in Family Patterns
Across the United States and Europe, in UNEQUAL FAMILY LIVES 21, 22 (Naomi R. Cahn et
al. eds., 2018).
43. DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD AND FAMILIES:
2010, at 5 (2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf [https://perma
.cc/2SR4-G9EK].
44. Stepler, supra note 24.
45. Gretchen Livingston, The Changing Profile of Unmarried Parents: A Growing
Share are Living with a Partner, PEW RES. CTR. 3 (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.pewsocial-
trends.org/2018/04/25/the-changing-profile-of-unmarried-parents/ [https://perma.cc/F8VV-
ZYS3].
46. Sheela Kennedy & Catherine A. Fitch, Measuring Cohabitation and Family Struc-
ture in the United States: Assessing the Impact of New Data from the Current Population
Survey, 49 Demography 1479, 1480 (2012).
47. Id. at 1481.
48. See Livingston, supra note 45, at 2.
49. Katharine Silbaugh, Distinguishing Households from Families, 43 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1071, 1083 (2016).
50. Lauren Bretz, As Rents Rise, More Renters Turn to Doubling Up, ZILLOW (Dec.
14, 2017), https://www.zillow.com/research/rising-rents-more-roommates-17618/ [https://per
ma.cc/9ZEY-9VSA].
51. See Paul Taylor et al., Living Together: The Economics of Cohabitation, PEW RES.
CTR. (June 27, 2011), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2011/06/
pew-social-trends-cohabitation-06-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9BJ-SSWF] (finding that
only 20% of people without a college degree and without a spouse or partner live alone;
they tend to live with other family members or other nonfamily members).
52. See Bretz, supra note 50.
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even if conjugal, a relationship passes from being “roommates with bene-
fits” to “couple.”53
Professor Bowman, in her comprehensive account of unmarried
couples, finds seven different typologies of unmarried cohabitants: dating
singles, trial marriages, couples without sufficient resources (for a wed-
ding or a home), low-income cohabitants who are living together for eco-
nomic reasons, Puerto Rican couples with children, divorced individuals
who are avoiding a marriage penalty or screening for a new spouse, and
older people.54 These categories overlap. Divorced individuals may be
cohabitating for the same reasons as never-divorced couples who are
screening for a spouse. Older people are often avoiding a marriage pen-
alty, though they could also think of themselves more as dating singles. It
is also possible, of course, that two members of a couple view their situa-
tion differently.55 One person may think of herself as screening; the other
may think of the couple as already committed.
Bowman’s data is also somewhat dated. More recent data suggests that
while rates of cohabitation are increasing, fewer cohabitations are leading
to marriage—though these findings reflect stark class differences.56 Co-
habitants with a college degree are more likely to end their cohabitation
by marrying. Cohabitants without a college degree are likely to break up
and cohabit with someone else in the future.57 Some demographers
surmise that the increase in cohabitation among those who are not likely
to transition to marriage reflects the perceived economic bars to marriage
and the decreased stigma associated with cohabitation.58
2. Why Do Cohabitants Cohabit?
Numerous studies have tried to discern why people cohabit. A common
reason given is simply “convenience and comfort.”59 It is much easier to
share a household with someone with whom one wants to spend the night
than it is to travel back and forth between households. The convenience
rationale might explain why many respondents suggest that the decision
to cohabit was not particularly deliberate, “it just happened.”60
For those who make a more deliberate decision to cohabit, economics
53. Elizabeth and Robert Scott suggest that the absence of conjugality “may generate
skepticism about the durability and stability” of relationships. Scott & Scott, supra note 26,
at 369. They may be correct—but note the implicit importation of normative sexuality in
that assumption. Why should commitment require conjugality?
54. BOWMAN, supra note 29, at 122.
55. This is not only common, it is gendered and classed. See infra note 115.
56. Karen Benjamin Guzzo, Trends in Cohabitation Outcomes: Compositional
Changes and Engagement Among Never-Married Young Adults, 76 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
826, 828 (2014).
57. Id. at 835.
58. Id. at 840.
59. Id.
60. Wendy D. Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Measuring and Modeling Cohabitation:
New Perspectives from Qualitative Data, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 989, 996 (2005).
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often plays a role.61 Sharing living space affords obvious economies of
scale.62 Economic advantages may be particularly compelling if one has a
child, either with the partner one cohabits with or with someone else.
Children are expensive. Unmarried parents today are far more likely to
be cohabiting than they used to be.63 For lower-income individuals, who
are likely to be living with other family members (not on their own) if
they are not cohabiting,64 cohabitation also affords the opportunity to be
away from others when one is with one’s romantic partner.65
The other main themes that emerge when demographers try to discern
why people cohabit go to “commitment, testing, and freedom,”66 all of
which are related. Cohabitation is a way to test a relationship and main-
tain the freedom to leave it before one commits. In Europe, where mar-
riage is even rarer than it is in the United States, cohabitants often cite
the need to maintain flexibility in employment. Cohabitants want to be
able to move to where the jobs are without having to worry about
whether such a move would be acceptable to a partner.67 Cohabitants
also cite the desire to maintain freedom to choose another partner.68 Co-
habiting does not necessarily signal a commitment to monogamy.
This last set of reasons suggests that the answers to “why did you co-
habit?” and “why didn’t you marry?” are often the same. Not wanting to
commit—to one person, to one place, to an interdependent life—is an
answer to both questions. Sometimes, though, asking the “why didn’t you
marry” question suggests that one’s willingness to marry is tied to eco-
nomic stability, at least in the United States.69
Numerous studies show that economic circumstances, especially men’s
61. SHARON SASSLER & AMANDA JAYNE MILLER, COHABITATION NATION: GENDER,
CLASS, AND THE REMAKING OF RELATIONSHIPS 38–41 (2017) (explaining that those in the
“service class” are more likely to move in together for financial and housing-related
reasons).
62. Economic exigency should not be confused with economic interdependence. Peo-
ple who live together in the same household virtually always share at least some household
expenses. Financial dependence, or interdependence, usually comes into play when one
member of a couple makes significantly more money than the other. That is not particu-
larly likely to be the case for lower-income couples, though it can be. Only 25% of cohab-
iting couples without any college education have a significant income differential. See
Taylor et al., supra note 51, at 17.
63. Livingston, supra note 45, at 3 (In 1968, 88% of unmarried parents were solo par-
ents. In 2017, only 53% of unmarried parents were solo parents.).
64. Only 20% of people without a college degree and without a spouse or partner live
alone; they live with other family members or other nonfamily members. See Taylor et al.,
supra note 51, at 21.
65. Id.
66. Brienna Perelli-Harris et al., Towards a New Understanding of Cohabitation: In-
sights from Group Research Across Europe and Australia, 31 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 1043,
1044, 1057 (noting that in the United States, cohabitation is likely to be seen as an alterna-
tive to being single).
67. Id. at 1064.
68. Id.
69. Across industrialized countries, marriage is viewed as an expression of commit-
ment, but European cohabitants do not cite the need for economic stability nearly as much
as low-income cohabitants in the United States do. Laurie Fields DeRose et al., Introduc-
tion, in UNEQUAL FAMILY LIVES, supra note 42, at 8.
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earnings, affect willingness to marry.70 Thus, lower-income couples may
cohabit more because of its economic benefits, but they marry less than
other cohabitants because of what they perceive as inadequate resources.
As one group of researchers put it, “[M]arriage both connotes and re-
quires a certain level of economic stability.”71
Legally, marriage does not require any economic stability. A marriage
license in the United States costs as little as $10 and never more than
$115,72 yet lower-income couples routinely cite the need to get out of
debt and find more stable employment before being ready to marry.73
Lower-income couples are not ill-informed about the affordability of a
marriage license; many acknowledge the possibility of “downtown wed-
dings.”74 Their reticence to marry more likely demonstrates their hesi-
tance to enter marriage’s communitarian regime, which brings with it
mutual obligations for sharing assets and debt. The less one has, the less
one may be willing to share and the more dangerous is the potential ac-
cumulation of debt.
Men’s economic prospects may be so predictive of likelihood to marry
because women recognize that a man with an unstable work history is
unlikely to be able to share much with her and more likely to force her to
share in his debt. By marrying such a man, she would incur opportunity
costs (foregoing a man who might be more stable) and potential legal
liability. Low-income men may be reluctant to marry because they know
they will be expected to contribute to the collective more than they feel
able to. As discussed more in Part IV.B, low-income women do not reject
marriage per se; they reject the idea of marrying any of the potential
spouses they have met thus far.75
Lower-income couples also frequently cite the inability to afford a
wedding as a reason for not marrying.76 The wedding rationale may just
be a smokescreen for the economic security rationale; once one can af-
ford an expensive wedding one is likely to be economically stable enough
to bear the risk of communitarian obligations. Alternatively, the wedding
rationale could say something about the social meaning of marriage. If
“marriage connotes economic . . . stability,”77 one is not “allowed” to get
married unless one can afford a wedding. It would be perceived as so-
cially fraudulent.
70. See, e.g., Pamela J. Smock et al., “Everything’s There Except Money”: How Money
Shapes Decisions to Marry Among Cohabitants, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 680 (2005).
71. Id. at 687.
72. Marriage License Fees by State, U.S. MARRIAGE LAWS.COM, https://www.usmar-
riagelaws.com/marriage-license/application/fees-cost/ [https://perma.cc/J3T7-YVFU].
73. Smock et al., supra note 70, at 687–88.
74. Id. at 688.
75. See infra Part IV.B and text accompanying notes 115–19.
76. Smock et al., supra note 70, at 688 (discussing reasons for why couples did not
want “just a downtown wedding”); see also GÖRAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A
LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR COHABITATION 962 (2008) (citing money as a reason people give
for not marrying).
77. Smock et al., supra note 70, at 687.
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If marriage would clearly benefit low-income couples, then the conno-
tation of marriage with economic stability is a significant problem. But if
people insist on a wedding as a way of protecting themselves from what
legal marriage could impose on them, there is much less need for con-
cern. In eschewing marriage, even under the cover of not being able to
afford a wedding, lower-income people may just be smart. They do not
want the legal responsibilities of marriage, so they cite the social expecta-
tions for a wedding as a legitimate reason to avoid legal status.
Before leaving the discussion of the demographic data on cohabitation,
a note on the presence of children in a cohabiting household is in order.
As will be clear in the next section, many proposals to extend family law’s
reach suggest that the presence of children should trigger a presumption
of marital-like rights and obligations. But the reasons for cohabiting do
not necessarily change, nor does the nature of the cohabitation necessa-
rily change, when children are born.
Child support obligations attach to all who have parental status, re-
gardless of where they live. One’s obligation to one’s legal child has noth-
ing to do with one’s living situation.78 Parents of a child are necessarily
legally bound to each other because they have responsibilities to coordi-
nate childcare with each other, and child support obligations are deter-
mined based on their collective income (even if they do not live in a
collective situation).79 So there is already a legal connection between un-
married parents. Why should the law assume greater legal rights and obli-
gations between parents because they live together?
The presence of children in a household may correlate with one parent
doing more unpaid care work than the other. Marital dissolution formu-
lae try to compensate for that unpaid care work by forcing parties to
share at dissolution. Unlike married parents, unmarried parents who con-
tribute disproportionate care work do not have access to that indirect
form of compensation at dissolution. But if forced to choose, the person
doing that care work might forego potential compensation for her care
work in return for not having to worry about being obligated for her co-
parent’s debts. Those proposals that assume that sharing joint legal pa-
rental obligations should necessarily trigger greater legal obligations to
the other parent may be depriving the parent who disproportionately in-
vests in parenting work of the autonomy that she wants and thinks she
deserves.
C. SUMMARY
The growing class of cohabiting couples is a diverse bunch with differ-
ent needs, different vulnerabilities, different approaches to commitment,
and different attitudes toward marriage. The scholarship calling for
78. As explained above, child support formulas are based on econometric data about
what a couple would spend on a child if they lived together and a child was brought into
the home, but the obligation attaches regardless of any particular living situation.
79. See Baker, supra note 12, at 329–31.
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greater recognition of these couples is also varied, with different scholars
focusing on different aspects of the work that family law does when sug-
gesting that nonmarital couples should have their relationships recog-
nized by the law. The next two parts dive into the benefits and challenges
of proposals (many of them already implemented in different jurisdic-
tions) that address the legal needs of cohabitants.
IV. COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS FUNCTIONAL
EQUIVALENTS
A. CONDUCT-BASED (OPT-OUT) SYSTEMS
The question of whether to treat some people who are not married as if
they are married dates back to Ancient Rome.80 During the Middle Ages,
the church tried to impose formal requirements on entry into marriage,81
but informal habits of cohabitation were so entrenched that the church
had to find mechanisms for treating informal unions as formal ones.82
The Church of England assumed jurisdiction over marriage in England in
1534, but it was not able to abolish the doctrine of common law mar-
riage—which afforded informal couples an opportunity to be recognized
as married—until 1753.83 By that time, the doctrine had already migrated
to the United States, and it proved useful in a country whose frontier was
constantly expanding and where communities were developing with mini-
mal religious and state infrastructure. In the mid-nineteenth century,
more than two-thirds of states in this country recognized common law
marriage. By the mid-twentieth century, most states had abandoned the
doctrine, either judicially or legislatively, after being convinced that it was
unnecessary, costly, and encouraged fraud.84 Only nine states and the
District of Columbia still recognize the original doctrine.85
Traditional common law marriage doctrine had four requirements.86
80. LIND, supra note 76, at 32–37 (describing marriage under Roman law). Rebecca
Probert, in her review of Lind’s book, questions how direct the line is between the Roman
recognition of nonmarital relationships and the American common law marriage. See Re-
becca Probert, Common Misunderstandings, 43 FAM. L.Q. 587, 588–89 (2009) (book
review).
81. LIND, supra note 76, at 120.
82. Id. at 123.
83. Lord Hardwicke’s Act abolished common law marriage in England. See id. at 136.
However, there is some debate about how established common law marriage was before it
was abolished. See Probert, supra note 80, at 591 (suggesting that Lord Hardwicke’s Act
was motivated by a desire to “put the requirements for a valid marriage on a statutory
footing,” not to abolish a doctrine that did not exist in England).
84. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 740–44 (1996) (questioning whether those were legitimate
rationales).
85. Common Law Marriage Fact Sheet, UNMARRIED EQUALITY, https://www.unmar-
ried.org/common-law-marriage-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/6YYH-WEGM]. Other states
including, Georgia, Idaho, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania don’t recognize common
law marriages started after a given date. Id. New Hampshire only recognizes common law
marriages for inheritance purposes (the opposite of the American Law Institute approach).
Id.
86. See Bowman, supra note 84, at 712.
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Two people had to have the capacity to marry (they were old enough, of
the opposite sex, not barred by incest laws, and not married to others)
and also an intent or an agreement to marry. Further, they had to have
cohabited, and they had to have held themselves out to the community as
married.87
Almost twenty-five years ago, Professor Cynthia Bowman presented
the feminist case for reinvigorating common law marriage.88 In her article
and subsequent book, Bowman argued that common law marriage pro-
tects those who have invested in, and relied on, a relationship. She asserts
that “[c]ohabitants who have merged their lives for a period of time de-
velop relations of dependency that leave them vulnerable when the union
ends in separation or death.”89 The investment in relationships that Bow-
man argued deserves redress is the investment in relationship that family
law also honors.
In her book, Bowman refined the common law marriage doctrine, re-
placing the traditional four requirements with a simple temporal require-
ment: “After they have been living together for two years or have a child,
a cohabiting couple should be treated by the law as though they were
married. This status would be imposed on a couple without their con-
sent”90 However, “couples [could] easily and effectively . . . contract out”
with a notarized standard form that would be filed with a court.91 In 2000,
the American Law Institute (ALI) offered a comparable idea, “domestic
partnerships,” though it left states free to choose the number of years
necessary to trigger the obligations.92 In cases in which a child was born
to or adopted by the couple, the ALI—like Bowman—suggested that its
“domestic partner” rules should apply regardless of any temporal
requirement.93
Notably, when both the ALI and Bowman first offered their proposals,
no states yet recognized same-sex marriage. Recognizing domestic part-
ners was a way of providing the rights and responsibilities of marriage to
people who could not access the institution, but advocates for these pro-
posals also had broader concerns. Bowman wrote that by treating a
couple that has cohabited as if they were married, the law protects against
the “injustice” that results to the person (more often a woman) who has
become “interdependen[t] and vulnerab[le].”94 Other scholars echo the
belief that “[c]ohabitation causes dependency”95 and that common law
marriage tries to alleviate the harm to those left vulnerable by that de-
87. Id.
88. Id. at 711–12.
89. BOWMAN, supra note 29, at 3.
90. Id. at 224.
91. Id. at 228.
92. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 6.03(2), (7) (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
93. Id. § 6.03(7)(l).
94. BOWMAN, supra note 29, at 172.
95. LIND, supra note 76, at 964.
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pendency.96 Another scholar refers to “the fact of dependency and inter-
dependency in adult relationships.”97
A proposal comparable to Bowman’s and the ALI’s was adopted by
Washington state. Washington does not use a strictly temporal approach
to assessing these relationships, which it calls “equity relationships” or
“committed intimate relationships,”98 but asks courts to assess the pur-
pose of the relationship, the extent to which the couple pooled their as-
sets, the intent of the parties, and the length of the relationship.99
Australia, and most of the Canadian provinces, employ judicial assess-
ments like this, which can be invoked unless the couple “opts out.”100 All
of these opt-out systems are conduct-based in that it is a couple’s conduct,
not state registration or contract, that gives rise to the obligation.
The proposals that use time as a trigger suggest that it is cohabitation
itself, not the intention of the parties or their subjective understanding of
commitment to the other person, that leads to obligation. In contrast, the
traditional common law marriage cause of action—and jurisdictions like
Washington and most of the Canadian provinces—use conduct to infer
cohabitants’ intent, purpose, and level of commitment. Those factors
have emerged as proxies for the emotional and financial interdependence
which proponents of these conduct-based regimes believe flow from
cohabitation.101
1. Financial Interdependence
There is no question that cohabiting couples can become financially
interdependent, especially if they divide labor in traditionally gendered
ways. This division of labor can benefit both parties but leave only one of
them financially vulnerable at dissolution if only that party forwent finan-
cial opportunities, provided unpaid household labor, or rendered herself
less able to take care of herself in a market economy.102 In explaining
why it adopted an opt-out regime, instead of a regime that required un-
married couples to register for alternative family status, the Australian
government opined it was people removed from market work who were
likely the “most vulnerable” and least likely to have knowledge of, or
access to, registration systems that might help them.103 In its official state-
ment explaining why many provinces adopted an opt-out system for co-
96. Id. at 864 (“A point of family law legislation is that [someone] . . . who has not
been able to provide any contribution to the community . . . is still given legal
protection. . . .”).
97. Stolzenberg, supra note 26, at 2019.
98. Walsh v. Reynolds, 335 P.3d 984, 986 n.1 (2014). The Washington courts initially
called these relationships “meretricious relationships,” but have since used a variety of
terms including “equity relationships,” “stable, marital-like relationship,” and “committed
intimate relationship.” See id.
99. Id. at 991.
100. BOWMAN, supra note 29, at 186–94 (Canada); id. at 194–201 (Australia).
101. In assessing a “relationship purpose,” the Washington courts looked to whether
the couple “support[ed] each other emotionally and financially.” Walsh, 335 P.3d at 991.
102. LIND, supra note 76, at 964 (explaining benefits of common law marriage).
103. BOWMAN, supra note 29, at 200.
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habitants, a Canadian Commission wrote, “It is likely that one or both
partners have assumed that the relationship will be permanent and that
the assets . . . are likely to be intermingled.”104
When courts try to determine whether cohabitants are financially inter-
dependent, the extent to which couples divide their labor in traditionally
gendered ways affects courts’ willingness to award relief. Washington
state, considered a leader in recognizing nonmarital relationships because
of its committed relationship doctrine, is more willing to find that a
couple that divided their labor along traditional gender lines pooled their
income than did a couple in which the woman continued to work but just
earned much less than the man.105 Canadian courts are split, sometimes
looking for gender roles, sometimes trying not to, but leaving litigants
confused about what kind of economic behavior will be considered
interdependent.106
In assessing interdependence this way, these courts are engaging in the
kind of granular analysis of a couple’s financial decision-making that fam-
ily law has abandoned. If a couple is married, it does not matter how
much a spouse forewent paid opportunities or how much unpaid labor
she performed in the household. She can be a stay-at-home mom, or a
college professor, or a waitress who never wanted to give up her job. It is
the fact that she (or he) is married that entitles her (or him) to marital
property and maintenance if the couple was married long enough. As one
observer commented, under Canada’s opt-out system “[c]ohabitants fall
under evaluative scrutiny of a kind spared to married couples by no-fault
divorce and a presumption of equal sharing.”107
2. Emotional Interdependence
While the financial interdependence inquiry is usually tied to tradi-
tional gender roles, the emotional interdependence inquiry, under the
guise of assessing “commitment” and “intent,” is usually tied to sex.
Göran Lind, in his comprehensive survey of common law marriage, found
that the judicial inquiries into whether a relationship qualifies as common
law marriage routinely depended, and still depends, on judicial evaluation
of the sexual relationship.108 Washington state found that having sex with
other people is an indication of an intent not to be committed,109 while
monogamy is evidence of intent to be committed110—though the court
has also indicated that some non-monogamy is consistent with a finding
104. ONT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
COHABITANTS UNDER THE FAMILY LAW ACT 3 (1993).
105. Compare Fenn v. Lockwood, 136 Wash. App. 1017 (Wash. Ct. App., 2006), with In
re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d 764 (Wash. 2000).
106. See Robert Leckey, Judging in Marriage’s Shadow, 26 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 25
(2018).
107. Id. at 26.
108. LIND, supra note 76, at 1042–44 (discussing the awkward inquiries into sex lives in
Washington state, New Zealand, and Canada).
109. In re Marriage of Pennington, 14 P.3d at 771.
110. In re Long & Fregeau, 244 P.3d 26, 30 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
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of a committed relationship because married people have affairs too.111
A court in British Columbia explained the difficulty, “With no social bar-
rier to a sexual relationship while dating and no social pressure to get
married, it is hard to say when a dating relationship turns from the casual
to the committed relationship.”112
Defenders of conduct-based systems implicitly or explicitly argue that
the judicial and personal costs of evaluating these relationships are neces-
sary because of the social good that these relationships do: “Family rela-
tionships provide their members with necessary intangible goods such as
community, emotional support, and intimacy, thereby promoting their in-
dividual well-being and helping them to develop the capacities necessary
for collective life.”113 Committed relationships in which emotional inter-
dependencies develop no doubt do that, but courts do not seem particu-
larly comfortable assessing which relationships those are. “Beyond the
sheer variety of conduct within couples, judges also stress difficulties re-
lating to the psychological element of commitment.”114
Bank accounts, spending patterns, and division of labor can, to a cer-
tain extent, determine financial interdependence, but it is much harder to
determine emotional interdependence. Commitment to any relationship
varies over time and is rarely completely mutual. Most studies find
gendered differences regarding both motivations for cohabitation and be-
liefs about the permanence of the relationship.115 Ultimately, courts ap-
pear to base their assessment of whether couples are committed by
deciding whether they think the couple’s relationship looks like “a good
marriage.”116
If in trying to recognize nonmarital families, courts are deciding
whether that nonmarital relationship looks like a good marriage, courts
are not recognizing alternative families at all. They are reifying whatever
normative view of marriage they bring with them to the courtroom. They
are providing relief only to those people who conduct their lives within
the norms of marriage. They are propping marital supremacy up, not
bringing it down.
Courts are also presiding over inquiries that may be acutely awkward
for litigants. Imagine the evidence one party might marshal to defeat a
claim that the relationship was committed: sexual behavior, disputes over
money, financial mistakes, disputes about sex, flirtations with other peo-
111. See id.
112. Bressette v. Henderson, [2013] B.C.S.C. 1661, ¶ 26 (Can.).
113. Stolzenberg, supra note 26, at 2040.
114. Leckey, supra note 106, at 31.
115. Id. at 22 (citing studies reflecting gendered differences for cohabitation); June Car-
bone & Naomi R. Cahn, Commentary, Afterword, and Concluding Thoughts on Family
Change and Economic Inequality, in UNEQUAL FAMILY LIVES, supra note 42, at 275 (citing
studies regarding class and gender differences regarding subjective understandings of co-
habitants’ likelihood to marry. For those with a college education, two-thirds of the women
and only one-third of the men said they expected the cohabitation to end in marriage; for
those without any college education, those percentages were reversed).
116. Leckey, supra note 106, at 26.
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ple, rejections within the relationship, etc. It was the distaste for, and in-
ability to evaluate, this kind of evidence that led to the no-fault divorce
revolution in family law in the 1970s and 1980s.117 Judges do not like
evaluating the emotional and financial behavior of couples. They are not
particularly good at it, and they do not tend to trust the evidence in front
of them. Given any particular judge’s lack of comprehensive experience,
they are left to judge the relationships in front of them with reference to
the only ones they know well—their own.
B. PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE
Proponents of conduct-based regimes may think such systems are
nonetheless necessary because they are likely to help the most vulnera-
ble. To asses this vulnerability rationale, it is worth integrating what the
demographic data tells us about who would most likely be affected. Rely-
ing on Census Bureau data, June Carbone and Naomi Cahn point out
that in the demographic most vulnerable economically, those in the bot-
tom quintile of earnings, 70% of women make the same, or more, money
than their spouses.118 It is harder to get that kind of economic data on
cohabiting couples (because they do not always identify as such), but
there is little reason to think that unmarried working-class women will be
helped that much by these opt-out regimes if they are likely to be earning
as much if not more than their cohabitants.
Nor is there reason to think that women of color, who are less likely to
marry than white women, would be helped by such a regime. Cohabita-
tion is more common in the Black community and cohabitations are
likely to last longer for Black couples than for white cohabiting couples of
all income levels, but the wage gap between Black women and Black men
is lower than it is for any other demographic group.119 Further, unem-
ployment is significantly higher for Black men than Black women.120 Ac-
117. As the Mortimer Commission of the Church of England concluded in 1966, these
kind of inquiries “invest[ ] with spurious objectivity acts [whose] real significance varies
widely.” MORTIMER COMM’N OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, PUTTING ASUNDER: A DI-
VORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 29 (1966); see also AIDAN R. Gough et al.,
Report of the Governor’s Comm’n on the Family 26 (1966); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and
Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1,
35–36 (1987) (explaining the desire of reformers to avoid excessive “factual” inquires in-
volving intimate conduct).
118. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Whither/Wither Alimony?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 925,
949–50 (2015) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE STARNES, THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: THE TROUB-
LED TRAJECTORY OF U.S. ALIMONY LAW (2014)) (noting that almost 70% of women in the
bottom quintile of earners have the same or higher income than their spouses).
119. Ariane Hegewisch & Heidi Hartmann, The Gender Wage Gap: 2018: Earning Dif-
ferences by Age and Ethnicity, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (March 7, 2019), https://
www.iwpr.org/publications/gender-wage-gap-2018 [https://perma.cc/EZD4-5MKZ] (In
2017 and 2018, Black women averaged over 90% of what Black men made, compared to
white women who averaged 81.7% of what white men made.).
120. U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., LABOR STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpsee_e16.htm [https://perma
.cc/TX2N-6DBA] (last modified Jan. 10, 2020).
2020] What is Nonmarriage? 225
cordingly, there is less reason to assume economic disparity in a Black
couple.
This does not mean that there is less reason to assume a gendered divi-
sion of unpaid work in communities of color or low-income communi-
ties.121 Various studies have concluded that lower-income men have not
taken on the responsibilities of the traditional non-working spouse; they
just do less work of all kinds.122 If the couple splits, these men could
benefit from a cohabitant being forced to split the property she brought
into the relationship.
For a host of reasons, working-class men, particularly men of color, are
vulnerable in today’s social and political economy.123 They deserve more
support—including policy initiatives to help them—but the working-class
women with whom they share their intimate lives should not necessarily
be the ones responsible for alleviating these men’s vulnerability. Impos-
ing marital rules on these cohabiting women could do just that.
The working-class woman, who earns comparably to her partner and
does most of the unpaid labor, can be doubly hurt by opt-out regimes.
Her ex-partner can invoke the law’s protection of cohabitants and trigger
an unpleasant and invasive judicial assessment of their home life. In addi-
tion, if the court determines that he was financially and emotionally de-
pendent, she may have to provide for him even though she never wanted
to commit to him financially. That is why she did not marry him in the
first place.124
The presence of children does not necessarily change this analysis.
Many unwed couples begin to cohabit after they learn that one of them is
pregnant.125 Pregnancies are often unplanned; having a child does not
always represent a decision to further commit to a cohabiting relation-
121. RICHARD A. LIPPA, GENDER, NATURE, AND NURTURE 183 (2005); JOAN C. WIL-
LIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 59
(2010) (explaining that traditional gender expectations are higher among working-class
men than other men).
122. Daniel Schneider, Market Earnings and Household Work: New Tests of Gender
Performance Theory, 73 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 845, 857 (2011) (explaining that studies find
that men who do not earn as much as female partners do less, not more, work in the
household).
123. WILLIAMS, supra note 121, at 81 (examining plight of working-class families in an
era in which there is no longer “family wage” that can support multiple dependents); JUNE
CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 15–157 (2014) (proposing various policies to help provide employment
and more security for working-class men (and women)); Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind
Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and
Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617 (2012) (discussing the vicious circles and
economic exigency for many low-income men).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 72–76 (exploring why many low-income wo-
men may not want to marry).
125. KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN
THE INNER CITY 41, n.27 (2013) (“a good number of [couples they studied] enter cohabita-
tion ‘shotgun’ . . . .”).
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ship.126 In low-income communities, traditional gender roles still tend to
determine who does most of the child care, even while mothers assume
the breadwinning role as well.127 Kathryn Edin’s ethnographic work in
the inner city, with both unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers,
shows that mothers assume the primary provider role for a child in part
because that gives mothers the power to leave a relationship.128 Given
economies of scale, if a partner is earning anything, cohabiting with that
partner may enhance a woman and her children’s living standard, but that
does not mean that she wants to be tied to that partner or that higher
standard of living. Low-income women often value their autonomy over
their relationship.129
The ability to walk away from a cohabitation that she feels is harmful
or insulting to her or her children can be more important than the money
a cohabitant can provide. This explains why so many low-income mothers
refuse to go after a child’s father for child support. As I have explained
elsewhere, in a manner the law does not officially countenance, many
unmarried mothers decide to be single mothers by choice.130 They forego
child support in return for the autonomy they feel is more important.131
They willingly reject the economic interdependence that proponents of
opt-out systems argue inevitably follows from cohabitation.
Recall that most low-income cohabitants cite the absence of resources
as the reason they have not gotten married. As discussed, it is not clear
why the absence of resources should matter to the marriage question be-
cause getting married is not expensive.132 But the absence of resources
correlates with the extent to which women seem to prize their autonomy
over their relationship. Living in, or at the edge of, poverty may make
one particularly wary of interdependence because of the risk that a part-
ner will not be able to provide what he has implicitly or explicitly prom-
ised (she knows she cannot depend on him financially) and the need to be
flexible in one’s own personal life (to be able to move closer to child care,
take a job elsewhere, or move in with other family members). It is per-
126. See id. at 53–54 (noting that while pregnancies follow a decision not to use con-
doms, that decision is understood as more about a commitment to monogamy than a deci-
sion to have a child).
127. KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN
PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 117, 203 (2005) (noting that low-income men in
their studies believe in traditional gender roles).
128. Id. at 203–04 (women understand that being the economic provider for their chil-
dren allows them to “follow through on [their] threat to leave [their partners] without
being ‘left with nothing’”).
129. Id.; see also CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 123, at 119–21 (discussing the impor-
tance of autonomy to lower-income women who do not feel they can rely on their partner
financially or emotionally).
130. Katharine K. Baker, The DNA Default and Its Discontents: Establishing Modern
Parenthood, 96 B.U. L. REV. 2037, 2079–81 (2016) (describing the dynamics of the deci-
sion-making that leads women to forego child support in return for freedom to leave a
relationship).
131. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 123, at 132 (“[a]utonomy means staying out of
court.”).
132. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
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fectly possible that contrary to what the Australian government sug-
gested, the most vulnerable cohabitants are the ones who knowingly,
carefully, and intelligently avoid a legal regime that assumes they are liv-
ing in an interdependent relationship.133
1. Government and Other Private Law Benefits
Most opt-out systems, like traditional common law marriage, treat a
cohabiting couple as married for all purposes, not just for purposes of
allocating property under family law rules.134 As indicated above, many
other legal entitlement programs rely on family law’s designation of mari-
tal status. Social Security, workers’ compensation, intestacy, tax, tort law,
and the regulatory bodies in charge of many forms of private insurance
(ERISA, health insurance) use marital status to determine various forms
of eligibility.135 Scholars often lament that so many unmarried cohabi-
tants are denied access to these legal regimes.136 The battle for same-sex
marriage brought the scope of family law status determinations to light,
as advocates underscored all of the ways in which the failure to allow
same-sex couples to marry deprived them of benefits regularly available
to others.137 But it is not clear that unmarried cohabitants want to be
treated as connected for purposes of such benefits.
a. The Finite Pot Problem
There is a difference between preventing one partner from accessing
the other partner’s Social Security benefits when both partners want her
to (which was the case for many same-sex couples) and creating a default
in which people are forced to share their Social Security benefits when
they may not want to (which may be the case for many low-income wo-
men). Social Security retirement, survivors and disability programs—
which collectively constitute the bulk of all non-Medicare Social Security
spending—allow family members to collect on an insured’s account.138
Spouses and children, together with the insured, can usually collect be-
tween 150% and 180% of the insured’s base level.139 But the amount that
family members can collect is capped and must be shared.140 Thus, if the
133. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
134. The ALI proposals apply only to traditional family law obligations but that was all
the drafters believed they were being charged with defining. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.01 cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
135. See supra Part II.B–C.
136. See, e.g., WEST, supra note 32, at 119–21 (suggesting there is no justification for
spouses but not unmarried partners to have access to another’s Social Security retirement
or disability).
137. See BRIEF ON THE MERITS OF AMICI CURIAE FAMILY LAW PROFESSORS & THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT EDITH
SCHLAIN WINDSOR at 20–24, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (No. 12-307)
(discussing federal statutes that invoked family status to determine federal benefits).
138. 20 C.F.R. § 404.403 (2015).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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insured’s primary insurance amount is $600, the maximum amount for
collection is usually $900. That incremental $300 must be split among eli-
gible family members.141 In this way, Social Security, like workers’ com-
pensation regimes that have a family cap,142 provides only a finite pot,
not unlike intestacy.
There is only so much in the pot, whether it be a deceased’s estate or a
Social Security account. The more takers, the less each taker gets. If the
law treats those without family status as if they had family status, then the
recipients who actually have family status have to share. An injured co-
habitant’s children would have to share Social Security disability or work-
ers’ compensation benefits with her cohabitant.
It is this scenario which belies the notion that there is necessarily injus-
tice in not treating a cohabitant, whether a co-parent or not, as married
for purposes of Social Security benefits. What if the insured would prefer
that her children get the entirety of her Social Security benefit? If she
marries her cohabitant, she forecloses that option, but prioritizing her
children may be part of her reason for not marrying. Many women, par-
ticularly low-income women, have children and commit to parenthood
before they find an adult they want to marry.143 Parenthood is the pri-
mary familial commitment for them. These women know what marriage
is and understand that they could marry but choose not to enmesh them-
selves with their cohabitants in order to protect their relationship with
their children. If mothers are prioritizing their children’s well-being over
their romantic partnerships, then arguably social welfare regimes should
as well.
The same analysis applies to critiques of the intestacy system. Bowman
cites studies showing that most cohabitants would prefer that some or all
of their estate go to their partner.144 If intestacy rules were only about
replicating donor intent, then arguably cohabitants should “take” under
intestacy statutes because most cohabitants would prefer it. But cohabi-
tants with children, particularly children who are young and/or struggling,
may not prefer that at all. In most states, treating cohabitants as married
would mean the cohabitant would necessarily take approximately half the
estate in intestacy.145 Spousal share requirements would force the chil-
dren to share even if the deceased left a will in which everything went to
her children.146 Given the variety of cohabiting arrangements, and the
141. Id.
142. For a famous example see Weber v. Aetna Casuality & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972), where the Supreme Court ruled that the legitimate children of the deceased had to
share the workers’ compensation award with the illegitimate child of the deceased.
143. EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 127, passim.
144. BOWMAN, supra note 29, at 227.
145. See RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 14–15
(2004) (discussing elective share for spouses).
146. Id. at 10 (“In the United States, the surviving spouse receives greater protection in
inheritance schemes than any other family member. In fact, in all but one state the surviv-
ing spouse is the only family member who consistently receives significant protection from
intentional disinheritance by the decedent.”); see also ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE
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different reasons people have for cohabiting, this seems like a stark de-
nial of autonomy for people who have chosen to live outside of family
law’s status-based regime.
b. The Shadow Welfare State
As for “shadow welfare state programs,” largely administered through
employers in this country,147 opt-out systems would treat cohabitants as
spouses by default. This would likely expand access to many of these pro-
grams and would probably be an unqualified good for cohabitants, al-
lowing them access to critical benefits that spouses get as a matter of
course. However, many employer-based programs already require em-
ployees to list who they want to count as their beneficiaries for particular
benefits.148 In effect, these programs already operate as a mandatory opt-
in system because employees must choose how they want third-party in-
surers to treat their relationships. The benefits of an opt-out system dissi-
pate if a mandatory opt-in system is in place because no one can forget to
opt in. A status-based approach to cohabitation would likely make more
shadow-welfare state benefits potentially available on the basis of cohabi-
tation, but it would not guarantee that a cohabitant would choose to des-
ignate his or her partner as a beneficiary.
c. Means-Tested Programs
Finally, as Erez Aloni has detailed, opt-out systems create significant
problems of deprivative recognition.149 Any cohabitant receiving means-
tested benefits, including Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families, student financial aid, or Supplemental Security Income, and co-
habitants receiving benefits based on previous marital status, like mainte-
nance or survivor’s benefits (including pension benefits) could lose those
benefits under an opt-out system either because their cohabitant’s income
would be imputed to them or because their entitlement only runs to those
who have not remarried.150 Those who have the most to lose from marital
status may be those who are dependent on means-tested programs or a
former spouse’s benefits. It seems likely that this is the group that is most
vulnerable. They also may well be the ones least likely to know they must
opt out of conduct-based regimes that impose marital status.
DUKEMINER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 72 (10th ed. 2017) (“In most states, the surviv-
ing spouse receives at least a one-half share of the decedent’s estate, which is a significant
increase from the one-quarter or one-third that was typical earlier in the twentieth
century.”).
147. See Blumberg, supra note 23, at 1266–67 (describing evolution of employer plans
that expanded health, disability, and retirement benefits).
148. See Matsumura, supra note 23, at 1340 (discussing employer plans that allow em-
ployees to name beneficiaries and the positive effects on employees of being able to have
their informal relationships recognized).
149. Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1276, 1281–82 (2014).
150. Id. at 1297.
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C. SUMMARY
All of the opt-out systems force individuals to share much of what they
have. In doing so, these systems honor and reward people who do the
relational care work that usually goes uncompensated in economic mar-
kets. Like family law, opt-out systems do not value that work with refer-
ence to the market but by reference to what the more financially
empowered partner can provide. Need is defined relatively. For those
concerned, as family law is, with honoring non-market work, opt-out sys-
tems make sense. But they come with costs. Because most opt-out re-
gimes are conduct-based, not status-based, they require invasive judicial
inquiries into the couple’s personal life. Proposals that use time or chil-
dren, rather than conduct, avoid categorization costs, but they potentially
impose obligations on those who can least afford them and force cohabi-
tants to preference their conjugal relationship over their parental
relationships.
V. THE ALTERNATIVES: REGISTRATION SYSTEMS
AND COMMON LAW REMEDIES
A. REGISTRATION (OPT-IN) SYSTEMS
In the early twenty-first century, in an effort to afford marital rights
and obligations to same-sex couples who could not marry, many states
and countries adopted (and several state supreme courts ordered) civil
union or domestic partnership alternatives that allowed same-sex couples
to opt into the rights and obligations of marriage.151 These alternative
statuses had no effect at the federal level, but within the states that recog-
nized them, couples who registered for these alternative statuses were
subject to family law’s redistribution system and were usually treated as
married people for all (state-based) tort, contract, and intestacy pur-
poses.152 After the U.S. Supreme Court enshrined the right of same-sex
couples to marry in Obergefell v. Hodges,153 many states eliminated these
marriage alternatives, but several states and foreign jurisdictions still of-
fer them as an option to both gay and straight couples. Opting into one of
these regimes is a way of undermining marital supremacy. It allows one to
accept family law’s communitarian rules, but not the patriarchal norms
and baggage that many believe accompany marriage.154
California, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon,
Washington, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia all still allow
couples to enter into a domestic partnership or civil union––the legal
ramifications of which are identical to those that would follow if they got
married.155 New Zealand, South Africa, the Netherlands, and Quebec
151. See Aloni, supra note 33, at 587–95.
152. Id.
153. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
154. For a summary of that particular critique of marriage, see Aloni, supra note 33, at
619–20.
155. Survey of state domestic partnership programs (on file with author).
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also offer something comparable to a domestic partnership program,
which if elected by a cohabiting couple, offers most or all of the legal
rights and obligations of marriage.156 Given the recurring critique of mar-
riage and marital norms one mighty think these marriage alternatives
would be popular. They are not. As Erez Aloni notes, “[O]nly in a minor-
ity of cases have the alternatives [to marriage] survived the legalization of
same-sex marriage, and even in cases where civil unions still exist, they
are hardly used . . . .”157
A notable exception to the dearth of robust civil union registration is in
France, where the option of entering a Pacte Civil de Solidarité (PAC) is
oft-chosen.158 PACs do not act as a substitute marriage provision, i.e. an
alternative status that grants the package of marital rights and obligations
under a different name.159 Instead, PACs offer couples even more control
over how the state treats their relationship by giving them the option of
registering their own contract detailing their obligations to each other.160
If couples do not draft their own contract, a default separate property
regime governs.161 Thus, in France, couples can marry and opt into the
traditional community property regime to govern the disposition of their
property at dissolution, they can allocate property rights as they wish, or
they can just use the PAC default which requires no sharing of property at
dissolution.162 PACs have proved very popular in France; just as the wed-
ding industry flourishes in the United States,163 there is a PAC industry in
France.164 Couples can register for PAC gifts with department stores and
schedule a PAC honeymoon vacation package.
Several commentators have argued that allowing couples the ability to
choose among obligation packages to each other best protects cohabi-
tants’ rights. Under this view, PAC-like provisions should be one of sev-
eral alternatives available. In 2009, William Eskridge predicted (or
perhaps hoped) that by now there would be variety of options, with eve-
rything from the most traditional covenant marriage––which makes di-
vorce particularly difficult––to civil marriage, civil unions, cohabitation
plans with varying degrees of reciprocal duties imposed on the couple,
and domestic partnerships in which there were no mutual obligations to
each other but the couple could opt to have an employer provide health
156. See Aloni, supra note 33, at 632 (most of the Canadian provinces have an opt-out
system, but Quebec has an opt-in system).
157. Id. at 626–27.
158. Id. at 577.
159. Id. at 636.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. For a discussion of PACs, see id. at 633–43.
163. For a survey of the industry, see Wedding Services Industry in the US––Market
Research Report, IBISWORLD (last updated March 2020), https://www.ibisworld.com/in-
dustry-trends/market-research-reports/other-services-except-public-administration/repair-
maintenance/wedding-services.html [https://perma.cc/V2SS-TXER].
164. Scott Sayare & Maı̈a de la Baume, In France, Civil Unions Gain Favor Over Mar-
riage, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/europe/
16france.html [https://perma.cc/N5RL-CVC9].
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insurance and other benefits to a named partner.165 Professor Aloni’s
idea of Registered Contractual Relationships updates Eskridge’s spec-
trum by suggesting that the parties themselves (as in France) craft their
rights and obligations, rather than choosing between certain menu
choices provided by the state.166
Since 2009, Colorado has had a statute that blends some of Aloni’s
respect for autonomy with Eskridge’s menu idea.167 Its “Designated Ben-
eficiary Agreement” provision allows a couple, neither of whom is mar-
ried or in a civil union with someone else, to choose all or only some of
twelve different reciprocal rights traditionally allocated to spouses.168 No-
tably, everything on the Colorado menu pertains to the right to have the
state or third parties treat one’s partner as a spouse. The Colorado statute
does not give cohabitants any redistribution rights against each other.
When Vermont adopted civil unions, it creatively extended an idea like
this to people who wanted to share various benefits even though they
were not in a conjugal relationship. (The Vermont legislature later moved
to eliminate that extension of civil union status because no one, literally
not one set of two people, signed up for it.)169
1. Autonomy
The indisputable advantage of these opt-in regimes is the control they
afford cohabitants to determine how the law will treat their intimate rela-
tionships. They provide couples the autonomy to shape their own rules
and escape the marriage/nonmarriage binary. If a couple does not want to
share property or debt with their cohabitant, they do not have to. If they
want their cohabitant to inherit their property in the event of their death,
or they want their cohabitant to have standing to sue a third party for
tortious conduct (intentional infliction of emotional distress or wrongful
death), they can so designate. On the other hand, if a couple wants to
marry, they can. No jurisdiction has done away with marriage. Thus, a
couple that opts in to one of these alternative statuses clearly opts out of
marriage.
What of the people who just do nothing, neither opting in nor opting
out? The adoption of an opt-in regime makes imposing marital rules on
that couple through an opt-out system untenable. The imposition of fam-
ily law rules on people who have not married may make sense if there is
only one set of family law rules. In those instances, if a party sacrificed as
if she was in a family, the law can treat her as it treats everyone else who
is in a family. But why should the law enforce marriage when the opt-in
165. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Liberal Vision of U.S. Family Law in 2020, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 245, 249–50 (Jack. M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
166. See Aloni, supra note 33, at 607–09.
167. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-105 (West 2017).
168. Id. For instance, one can designate a partner to get rights to workers’ compensa-
tion, inheritance, hospital visitation, pensions, standing to sue for wrongful death, and
health insurance, among other benefits.
169. See H. 738, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2014).
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regime presents so many alternatives? If there are many ways of treating
family members as family members, how can the law know which set of
rules to apply? The rejection of the marriage/nonmarriage binary in opt-
in regimes nullifies the functional, “family is as family does,” rationale for
opt-out regimes.
Moreover, in practice, those who opt into something other than mar-
riage also opt into non-communitarian, neoliberal rules of property distri-
bution. Colorado’s reciprocal beneficiary statute has no provision for
sharing accumulated property or future income.170 The state does not
provide any mechanism (other than traditional contract) for sharing, so
the decision to use that menu is a decision not to adopt family law’s com-
munitarian rules. In France, where couples have the opportunity to craft
their own contract and distribute their joint and future wealth in a man-
ner of their own choosing, couples rarely do so; only 2% of PAC couples
submit their own contract.171 Instead, PAC couples allow the default rule
of separate property to control, thus ensuring the economic vulnerability
of a cohabitant who disproportionately invests in non-market work.
When given a choice, couples in France are choosing not to protect
against the vulnerabilities caused by economic and emotional
interdependence.
Those who favor opt-out systems argue that opt-in systems thus run too
much risk of leaving cohabitants unprotected. This autonomy/vulnerabil-
ity trade-off is inevitable. One’s position on which is more important—
protecting individuals’ autonomy and ability to craft their own family law
rules as opt-in systems do, or protecting against the vulnerabilities that
can be caused by cohabitation, as opt-out systems do—likely determines
whether one favors an opt-in or opt-out system.
2. Normativity
Opt-in systems reject marital normativity and “marriage as the mea-
sure of all things”172 by providing more options. In theory, marriage will
not reign as supreme, and marital norms can be more easily eroded if
marriage is not the only game in town. But opt-in systems do not appear
to be as good at disrupting marital normativity as proponents may imag-
ine. As the dearth of domestic partnership and civil unions entered into
post-Obergefell attests, when given the option to marry alongside another
registration option, the vast majority of people choose marriage. This is
not the law privileging marriage so much as it is people privileging
marriage.
Professor Serena Mayeri is right that “marriage is both a privileged
status and a status of the privileged,”173 but it is a privileged status, in
part, for reasons exogenous to the legal regime. People choose marriage
170. See §§ 15-22-101 to -112.
171. Aloni, supra note 33, at 644.
172. See Franke, supra note 4, at 2686.
173. Mayeri, supra note 1, at 1283.
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even when it is not the only game in town. The commercial and social
infrastructures that support marriage as an institution—The New York
Times Wedding Section, the billion dollar bridal industry, secular tradi-
tions around exchanging rings and gifts, religious traditions around mar-
riage—thrive not because the law mandates them, but because people,
especially privileged people, enthusiastically and lavishly prop them up.
Even if the law were to abandon marriage as an option, the experience
of PACs in France suggests that the commercial and social infrastructure
that has supported marriage as an institution can readily shift to support
an alternative. That social and economic infrastructure now channels
French couples into PACs just as the American infrastructure channels
people into marriage. People in France are normalizing, celebrating, and
financially supporting PACs just as marriage is supported in this country.
Thus, PACs do not offer “nonnormative notions of kinship, intimacy, and
sexuality.”174 They offer an alternative structure with comparable norms
and, coincidently, less economic protection for those who invest in the
relationship at the expense of market work.
Professor Aloni argues that one of the fundamental goals of family law
is to provide cultural recognition of relationships because “recognition is
a vital human need.”175 Other scholars seem to share this view, criticizing
the way in which nonmarital relationships are seen as “undignified, less
profound, and less valuable” than marriage.176 Opt-in systems are
thought to provide the dignity that comes from recognition while simulta-
neously rejecting marital hegemony. But the PAC experience suggests
that there is a recognition/normativity tradeoff just as there is an auton-
omy/vulnerability tradeoff.
The cultural recognition that people crave for their relationships neces-
sarily encourages a normative approach to kinship, intimacy, and sexual-
ity. An alternative normative approach, i.e. an alternative to marriage,
may be preferable, but if we displace marital supremacy by providing al-
ternative forms of recognition, those new forms of recognition will be-
come the new normal. PAC supremacy, civil union supremacy, or some
comparable supremacy will emerge and bring with it a new normative
approach. Couples will be channeled into something else precisely be-
cause they want recognition.
Indeed, all of the current opt-in approaches channel people into certain
kinds of intimate behavior. Someone has to decide what goes on the
menu. Of the states that still allow couples to register for domestic part-
nership instead of marriage, all but California require that the couple live
together, even though no state requires married people to live to-
gether.177 Almost all domestic partnership provisions require parties to
174. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399, 1414 (2004).
175. Aloni, supra note 149, at 1333–34.
176. See generally Murray, supra note 3, at 1210. This critique was particularly strong in
response to Justice Kennedy’s paean to marriage in Obergefell.
177. See supra note 154.
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attest to some level of “commitment” and all require that those entering
not be married or in another domestic partnership.178 Colorado prohibits
designating beneficiaries under its statute if one is already married or has
entered into any other designated beneficiary arrangement.179 Even con-
tract-based PACs require that those submitting an individualized set of
commitments under that system not have entered into a marriage or PAC
with anyone else.180 All of these options channel people into monoga-
mous, committed, exclusive relationships.181 They do not appear willing
to recognize “family forms” that are very much different from marriage
or remotely “complex.”182
3. Summary
To be clear, there is no obvious harm in states offering opt-in alterna-
tives even if they do just provide slight variations on marriage’s norma-
tive path, as long as one is comfortable with prioritizing a couple’s
autonomy over the potential vulnerability that opt-out systems protect
against. Opt-in systems let individual couples choose alternatives to mar-
riage. Not only does the choice of alternatives serve autonomy goals by
giving individuals nonmarital options, the options couples most com-
monly choose serve autonomy goals because couples tend to choose sets
of rights and obligations which make them less responsible for each other
than does marriage. In other words, when given the choice, couples who
reject marriage also reject marriage’s imposition of non-market-based
communitarian approaches to obligation, entitlements, and value. The
family law approach consciously quashes autonomy; opt-in systems cele-
brate it. If policymakers want to provide autonomy and retain family
law’s communitarian values, they must make sure that a communitarian
option is a “on the menu,” though experience to date suggests that people
will not choose it.
Opt-in systems thus mostly serve the needs of those who want their
relationships recognized, legally and culturally, but do not want to buy
into family law’s obligations or marriage’s troubled history. Opt-in sys-
tems undermine marital supremacy somewhat, but all forms of legal and
cultural recognition necessarily bring with them some normative channel-
ing. The law has to recognize the family forms that it is honoring, and
people have to recognize the family forms they are celebrating.
A regime that avoided all legal categorization of intimate relationships,
one that treated cohabitants just like all other people who engage in so-
178. Id.
179. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-104 (West 2017).
180. See Aloni, supra note 33, at 609.
181. This is where the Vermont reciprocal beneficiary status was truly different. The
couple could be blood relatives or related by adoption to be reciprocal beneficiaries. But
no one wanted that alternative kind of recognition. See H.738, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Vt.
2014).
182. Aloni, supra note 149, at 1278, 1300 (extolling opt-in systems’ ability to recognize
“complex family forms”).
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cial and economic relations, would arguably involve the least amount of
channeling and the least normativity. That is why some scholars argue
that cohabitants should just be treated like everyone else who enters into
contracts, provides services, or bestows gifts. Cohabitants should be enti-
tled to legal rights not because they are in identifiable relationships, but
because they have entered into agreements, invested resources, and be-
haved in ways that the law elsewhere recognizes as worthy of compensa-
tion or redress. The problem, according to these scholars, is that courts
refuse to see the economic exchange in these relationships as a legitimate
subject for courts. We turn to that next.
B. EXISTING COMMON LAW AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES
In the last fifty years, courts have wrestled with whether contract law or
other equitable remedies might provide relief for those who feel harmed
by the consequences of cohabitation. Traditionally, the law did not en-
force contractual claims between cohabitants on the theory that all such
contracts necessarily included sex as consideration.183 Enforcing a con-
tract between cohabitants or paramours was seen as inevitably enforcing
a contract for sex.184
By denying relief to cohabitants, who could not sue in family law be-
cause they were not married but were barred from suing outside family
law because such suits would sanction immoral behavior, the traditional
treatment of cohabitation channeled sexual activity into marriage and
helped enshrine what Professor Janet Halley has referred to as “family
law exceptionalism.”185 What happens in families and among family
members is one thing; what happens in the market is something alto-
gether different.186 By the late twentieth century, though, contract argu-
ments emerged in most states as a viable means of determining some
rights and obligations between former cohabitants because the channel-
ing was not working. Cohabitation was becoming much more prevalent
and the moral opprobrium for nonmarital sex grew outdated. The trend
started in California.
In 1971, after having been asked to leave the home she had shared for
seven years with movie star Lee Marvin, Michelle Triola sued Marvin for
damages associated with their breakup.187 She alleged a breach of express
183. See, e.g., Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 Ill. 229, 249 (1882) (“An agreement in consider-
ation of future illicit cohabitation between the parties is void . . . .”); Gauthier v. Laing, 70
A.2d 207, 2010 (N.H. 1950); Grant v. Butt, 17 S.E.2d 689, 692 (S.C. 1941).
184. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 589 (AM. LAW. INST. 1932) (“A bargain
in whole or in part for or in consideration of illicit sexual intercourse or of a promise
thereof is illegal . . . .”).
185. Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
1, 3 (2011) (“Contract, quasi-contract, and tort became the law of everyone . . . while the
law of marriage became the law of special persons, incapacitated to varying degrees from
contract . . . . [t]he market was the family’s opposite . . . .”).
186. HASDAY, supra note 19, at 7 (“Family law rejects what the law otherwise em-
braces, and embraces what the law otherwise rejects . . . .”).
187. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110–11 (Cal. 1976).
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and implied contract and pled various equitable doctrines, including un-
just enrichment and constructive trust.188 She asked the court to use mar-
ket-like remedies—damages—to compensate for what was seen as a
family law harm: the economic loss that results when a couple splits up.189
The California Supreme Court said she could proceed.190
Marvin made headlines at the time because it involved a celebrity in
what was still considered risqué behavior, nonmarital cohabitation. Mar-
vin continues as a staple in family law casebooks because it marks the
beginning of the modern trend to break down the barrier that tradition-
ally separated family law from other legal claims.
Three years after Marvin, the Illinois Supreme Court decided the recip-
rocal family law casebook staple, Hewitt v. Hewitt.191 In a case involving a
less famous, but arguably more sympathetic plaintiff, the Illinois Supreme
Court denied all relief to a woman who had lived with a man for fifteen
years, raised three children with him, secured loans from her parents on
his behalf, and helped him grow his dentistry practice; but the couple
never married.192 Like Michelle Triola, Victoria Hewitt brought explicit
and implicit contract claims as well as claims for other equitable relief.193
The Illinois court explicitly rejected the reasoning of the Marvin court,
finding that if express contracts could be enforced, then implicit contracts
must be actionable as well.194 Enforcing such claims would constitute
“the return of varying forms of common law marriage,” which the Illinois
Legislature abolished in 1905.195 The primary concern of the court seems
to have been not condoning cohabitation.
Hewitt was widely criticized and not much followed in its totality. Only
Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi are “as vocal about non-recogni-
tion”196 of contract and equitable remedies as Illinois. Most state courts
now entertain some form of contractual or equitable action at the end
of a cohabitation.197 Several states require an allegation of an explicit
contract.198 A few states enforce only written contracts between
cohabitants.199
Prior to Obergefell, contractual causes of action were particularly im-
portant to same-sex couples who were denied access to marital dissolu-
tion rules. Some members of same-sex couples had success, particularly in
188. Id. at 111, 116.
189. Id. at 116.
190. Id.
191. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
192. See id. at 1205.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 1207.
195. Id. at 1209.
196. Albertina Antognini, Against Nonmarital Exceptionalism, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1891, 1922 (2018) (“Four jurisdictions are vocal about denying property rights to individu-
als in nonmarital relationships: Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana and Mississippi.”).
197. Id. at 1912.
198. Id. at 1918.
199. For a list, see Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial
Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1278 n.98 (2015).
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states that may have been more accepting of same-sex relationships.
Three years ago, one member of a same-sex couple in Illinois, Eileen
Brewer, sought to capitalize on the particular vulnerability that same-sex
couples faced before Obergefell and asked the Illinois Supreme Court to
overturn Hewitt, at least for same-sex couples who could not have mar-
ried.200 As the Illinois Supreme Court wrote, the “facts of [Blumenthal v.
Brewer were] almost indistinguishable from Hewitt, except, in this case,
the parties were in a same sex relationship.”201
Eileen Brewer, a lawyer and judge, and Jane Blumenthal, a doctor,
broke up in 2008, three years before civil unions became available in Illi-
nois, and six years before that state passed legislation allowing same-sex
couples to marry.202 Brewer and Blumenthal had been together since
1981.203 To the surprise of many, the Illinois Supreme Court was un-
phased by the length of the couple’s relationship, their economic and fi-
nancial enmeshment, their parenting of three children, and the couple’s
lack of access to family law.204 The court found the basic holding of Hew-
itt—that because the legislature had abolished common law marriage in
1905, contracts based on a marriage-like relationship were unenforceable
in Illinois—still persuasive.205
Blumenthal has been as widely criticized as Hewitt.206 According to the
Illinois Supreme Court, marriage and civil unions are the only legal vehi-
cles available if one wants to establish legal rights and obligations stem-
ming from a relationship.207 If the legislature has denied access to those
family law statuses, one has no remedy. This means, as Professor
Courtney Joslin has explained, that the act of cohabitation deprives one
of rights otherwise available to everyone.208 One loses the right that un-
married non-cohabitants have to sue in contract and unjust enrichment,
200. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 69 N.E.3d 834, 839 (Ill. 2016).
201. Id. at 852.
202. Id. at 848, 857.
203. Id. at 840.
204. See id. at 853.
205. Id. at 853, 857.
206. See Douglas NeJaime, The Family’s Constitution, 32 CONST. COMMENTARY 413,
448 n.116 (2017) (classifying Blumenthal as “regressive”); Joslin, supra note 2, at 469 (sug-
gesting the Blumenthal court used an “ossified . . . framework”); Murray, supra note 3, at
1246–48 (critical of the holding for reifying marriage).
207. The Court in Blumenthal distinguished a line of Illinois cases that had allowed
former cohabitants to collect on claims that were “substantially independent of the
nonmarital relationship between the parties.” Blumenthal, 69 N.E.3d at 853–54. In these
cases, a cohabitant would usually bring a claim for partition or unjust enrichment based on
one party’s investment in a piece of property that was titled in the other party’s name. Id.
The entitlement is not construed as born of investment in the relationship, but investment
in a piece of property, and it must be substantial. Compare Spafford v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d
241, 245–46 (Ill. 1983) (cohabitant who purchased or contributed down payment to vehi-
cles that were titled in the other cohabitant’s name was entitled to equitable relief), with
Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920, 920, 922 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (cohabitants jointly obtained
loan for property that was titled in only one of their names. Both parties contributed to
loan, tax, and insurance payments, but title was never transferred to both parties. No re-
covery based on Hewitt.).
208. Joslin, supra note 2, at 482.
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but one is also barred from pursuing the family law claims that family
status affords.
As written, Blumenthal is a hard decision to defend and this section
does not try. But analyzing the facts of Blumenthal suggests that if the
Court had been less eager to uphold Hewitt, and allowed Brewer to pro-
ceed as Michelle Triola had, Brewer might well have ended up like
Michelle Triola did—with nothing. Marvin, Hewitt, and Blumenthal were
all summary judgment decisions. On remand, after a trial on the facts, the
court in Marvin found no express contract, no implied contract, and no
grounds for equitable relief.209 Indeed, it found that Michelle Triola had
been more enriched by her relationship with Lee Marvin than vice
versa.210 Eileen Brewer could well have encountered the same fate, and
therein lies the problem with common law and equitable claims in cohabi-
tation. It is a practical problem, not a theoretical one.
1. Blumenthal v. Brewer and the Limitations of Nonfamily Law
Remedies
After Blumenthal and Brewer split up, Dr. Blumenthal filed a com-
plaint for partition of their Chicago home, one of the three properties
that the two women owned together.211 Brewer’s counterclaim contained
five counts, four of which pertained to the Chicago home212 and one of
which sought either a constructive trust on the net earnings from Blumen-
thal’s medical practice, or restitution for the funds that Brewer contrib-
uted towards the purchase of the medical practice.213 The arguments
made in all of the house-related claims were ultimately entertained by the
trial court deciding the partition action.214 After a three-day trial, in
which the trial court heard evidence regarding who contributed the down
payment to the house, who lived in the house when, whose inheritance
was spent, and how the couple handled joint investments, the trial court
awarded Brewer $534,200.55 worth of the $1 million house.215
Brewer got slightly more than half of the value of the house, notwith-
standing the unrefuted testimony that Blumenthal contributed the en-
209. Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558–59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
210. Id. at 558.
211. There was also jointly owned property in Michigan and Mexico, but the parties
apparently divided that without incident. See Cynthia Dizikes et al., Legal Battles Hidden
from Public View, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 24, 2013, 2:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/ct-met-cook-county-hidden-cases-20130224-story.html [https://perma.cc/TM8M-
2Y5H] (explaining that the record was sealed in this case, but that the parties owned
properties in Michigan and Mexico as well as in Chicago).
212. Count I sought a constructive trust on the house based on unjust enrichment;
Count II sought an “equitable distribution” of the house (equitable distribution is the term
commonly used to describe how marital property is distributed in non-community property
states. See supra Part II); Count IV claimed that Brewer should be compensated for the
amounts she spent taking care of the house after Blumenthal moved out; Count V sought
quantum meruit for the value Brewer’s labor had added to the house. See Blumenthal, 69
N.E.3d 834.
213. See id. at 841.
214. Id. at 845.
215. Id. at 845–46.
240 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
tirety of the original $235,000 down payment to the house.216 In other
words, Brewer likely got what she would have gotten if the court had
treated the home as marital property subject to division.217 The one claim
not relevant to the partition action, Brewer’s claim to a share of the medi-
cal practice or the proceeds of the medical practice, was the only claim
the Illinois Supreme Court specifically rejected as inconsistent with state
law that had abolished common law marriage.218
Under family law doctrine, if the couple had been married, the medical
practice would not have been subject to property division because, as a
nondoctor, Brewer could not be considered an owner of a medical prac-
tice under Illinois law.219 But, if they had been married, Brewer could
have made a claim for maintenance (alimony), based on Blumenthal’s
higher earnings in the medical practice.220 Her equitable claims for ongo-
ing proceeds from the medical practice, which sounded in contract and
unjust enrichment, were the nonmarital alternatives to maintenance.221
a. Explicit Contracts
If Brewer and Blumenthal had made an explicit, oral contract regard-
ing how to divide the earning from the medical practice, what would it
have said? We can’t know for sure, of course. The vast majority of explicit
contracts courts see are written pre- or post-nuptial agreements, entered
into in order to contract around the marital sharing rules.222 In order to
make an explicit contract claim for the kind of relief she sought, Brewer
would have had to allege that the couple explicitly agreed to the marital
law principles that require post-dissolution sharing of future income.
For same-sex couples pre-Obergefell, that kind of agreement might
make sense. Contract would have been the only way to signal that desire
to share. For couples with the option of marrying or entering a civil
union, however, one would have to allege that the decision to contract
instead of entering into a formal status had to do with concerns other
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. Id. at 856.
219. Id. at 849.
220. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/504 (West 2018).
221. It is not at all clear Brewer would have been entitled to that support under the
Illinois maintenance statute. See id. According to her online resume, she was continually
employed as a lawyer during the couples’ relationship. Hon. Eileen M. Brewer, JAMS,
https://www.jamsadr.com/brewer/ [https://perma.cc/LF6V-SV8L]. She was chief counsel to
arguably the second most powerful political position in Chicago, and she was a judge after
that. Id. She alleged that she invested more in the family because Dr. Blumenthal earned
more—and the Illinois court took that as true at summary judgment—but it easily could
have been contested. By 2012, two years after she filed her claim against Blumenthal, her
pension as judge vested, entitling her to 80% of her judicial salary for life. Under Illinois
family law doctrine, Blumenthal could have claimed an entitlement to a share of Brewer’s
pension.
222. See Judith T. Younger, Lovers’ Contracts in the Courts: Forsaking the Minimum
Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 349, 420 (2007) (analyzing courts’ willingness
to enforce prenuptial contracts in which one party gets substantially less than half of the
property).
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than the financial ramifications of dissolution. The contract would have to
reflect a desire to eschew the institution of marriage (and civil unions)
while embracing their communitarian approach to property. In practice,
these allegations of express oral contracts often crumble under scrutiny at
trial.223 Michelle Triola’s is one famous example. The trial court did not
believe that Lee Marvin agreed to share anything.
More common are alleged contracts that never make it to trial. Con-
sider the contract alleged by Donnis Whorton, a gay man suing his ex-
partner, Benjamin Dillingham.224 Whorton, who at the beginning of the
parties’ relationship was studying for an Associate of Arts degree, alleged
that the parties orally agreed that in return for Whorton rendering ser-
vices as “chauffeur, bodyguard, social and business secretary, partner and
counselor in real estate investments, . . . [and] traveling and social com-
panion,” Dillingham promised “a one-half equity interest in all real estate
acquired in their joint names, and in all property thereafter acquired by
Dillingham.”225 Whorton alleged Dillingham further “agreed to finan-
cially support Whorton for life, . . . grant Whorton invasionary powers to
savings accounts held in Dillingham’s name, and permit Whorton to
charge on Dillingham’s personal accounts.”226 In addition, “the parties
[apparently] specifically agreed that any portion of the agreement found
to be legally unenforceable was severable and the balance of the provi-
sions would remain in full force and effect.”227
Whorton survived summary judgment on this claim, but it is hard to see
how his allegations pass a laugh test. Would any reasonable judge or jury
believe that Dillingham actually promised all that without writing it
down? How plausible are oral severability provisions?228 Perhaps Dilling-
ham did make lavish promises when in the throes of early love, but a
serious assessment of the contract would require an analysis of whether it
was reasonable to conclude that both parties believed they had a legally
binding agreement.229 Relying so heavily on the idea that Dillingham
might have done so out of “love” opens the door for Dillingham to argue
that Whorton was comparably compromised by “love,” so compromised
that he was willing to throw away his associate’s degree in order to live (a
significantly more luxurious life) with Dillingham without any promise of
223. See Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381,
1396–97 (2001); Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal
Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 317–19 (2008) (both articles describe the difficulty in bring-
ing these claims).
224. Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 406–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
225. Id. at 407.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Whorton needed to allege this in case the court found that sex was a part of their
bargain. Whorton did not want the sexual consideration to invalidate the rest of the alleged
contract. Cf. Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (alleged services
provided included “lover”). Jones’s claim was denied. Id. at 135.
229. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (AM. LAW. INST. 1932) (“A mani-
festation of mutual assent by the parties to an informal contract is essential to its
formation . . . .”).
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future compensation in return.230
No trial ever determined the existence of the alleged oral contract in
Whorton. No doubt it was not worth it to Dillingham to litigate the non-
existence of the oral agreement. He was better off just paying off his ex-
lover to settle the case. When trial courts do try to ascertain the content
of an alleged contract, they impose high evidentiary burdens—probably
because they are wary of claims like Whorton’s. Such claims are not that
prevalent or successful.231
In Blumenthal, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed its refusal to en-
tertain any such claim. That reasoning has been rightly rejected by com-
mentators, but the problem for most cohabitants seeking relief under
express contract is that absent a writing, the claims often lack plausibility.
People in affective relationships don’t usually think or speak “contract”
with each other.232 Risk-averse, forward thinking, or especially careful
people may be willing to think in such contract terms, but their fastidious-
ness leads them to write their contracts down, which makes enforcement
much easier.233 Those written contracts also don’t tend to provide the
kind of comprehensive post-dissolution equalization of property and in-
come that family law provides and that Eileen Brewer was asking for.
b. Implicit Contract
Litigants who are either unable or unwilling to conjure up an explicit
agreement can also use notions of implicit contract to make a claim
against a former cohabitant. Standard contract doctrine holds that courts
can find contracts implied in fact when “[a] promisor . . . has reason to
believe that the promisee will infer” an intention to be bound.234 The
doctrine of implied-in-fact contract applies social norms to facts in order
to determine whether both parties should have understood that they were
entering into an agreement that the law would enforce. Perhaps living
together in the same home, pooling one’s money, going out in public to-
gether, and providing emotional support to each other constitutes con-
duct from which courts can infer an agreement to divide jointly used
230. The plausibility of Whorton’s claim also relies completely on marital norms. He is
alleging an agreement to share property and the post-dissolution income stream in a man-
ner that finds a parallel nowhere in law but marriage. The laws of partnership do not re-
quire sharing post-dissolution income from all sources. In allowing this case to survive
summary judgment, the court reified the marital norms that Wharton invoked by alleging a
contract that paralleled marital rights and obligations, but it was not the judge that initi-
ated the use of martial norms, it was Whorton. See Whorton, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
231. See Estin, supra note 223, at 1396–97.
232. See Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1365, 1373 (2001) (“people do not think of their intimate relationships in
contract terms. . . . [Because] contract involves more than reciprocity; it involves a bar-
gained-for exchange.”).
233. It is the relative ease of enforcing written agreements that led several states to
require a writing if a cohabitation contract is to be enforced. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 513.075 (West, 1980); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (West 2005); Posik v. Lay-
ton, 695 So.2d 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154,
1157 (N.Y. 1980); Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992) (written contracts).
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
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property and post-dissolution income. That is what Michelle Triola al-
leged. On remand, the trial court was not convinced, holding instead that
“the conduct of the parties . . . [did] not reveal any implementation of any
contract nor . . . give rise to an implied contract.”235
In practice, implied contract claims are not that much more successful
than express oral contract claims, unless a party is suing for a share of
particular piece of property, usually titled in the other party’s name, but
into which the suing party invested labor or resources.236 Successful
claims usually involve a distinct monetary contribution or investment in a
house237 or valuable collector’s item.238 Courts will entertain these suits
as long as the consideration alleged steers clear of the sexual relationship
and can be traced to the distinct piece of property.239
As discussed, the claim of Brewer’s that the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected was not the claim for the Chicago house, but a claim for a share
of the proceeds from her partner’s medical practice, an economic entity
in which she played no direct part, except contributing to the joint funds
that, years earlier, had allowed Blumenthal to buy into the practice.
Brewer’s claim to the proceeds of the medical practice, like Michelle Tri-
ola’s implied contract claim for part of Lee Marvin’s income, asked the
court to find a contractual bargain in the relationship itself, in how she
cared for the family and the home, not in her contribution to the medical
practice.
This argument should sound familiar. The claimant is asking the court
to infer that the parties should be legally bound to each other because of
the way they lived as a couple. In determining what can be inferred from
that way of life, a court must use the same social norms that it uses when
considering whether a cohabitating couple lived together in a committed
relationship in which economic and emotional interdependencies devel-
oped.240 Implicit contract claims are the doctrinal equivalent of an opt-
235. Garrison, supra note 223, at 316 (quoting Marvin v. Marvin, 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
3077 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)).
236. See Antognini, supra note 2, at 46–48 (discussing cases in which courts award
nonmarital cohabitants a share of property).
237. Kaiser v. Fleming, 735 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (recovery of money contrib-
uted toward mortgage on house titled in cohabitant’s name).
238. See Spafford v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241 (Ill. App Ct. 1983) (recovery for money used
to buy antique cars during the relationship).
239. Compare Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) with Whorton
v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 406–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); see also Bergen v. Wood, 18
Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“services as a social companion and hostess” are
insufficient consideration because they “are not normally compensated and are inextrica-
bly intertwined with the sexual relationship”). In her recent comprehensive review of cases
in which courts distributed property at the end of a relationship that was nonmarital at
some point, Albertina Antognini argues that when courts take seriously the question of
whether cohabitants intended to share their property, they are more likely to divide the
property equally. See Antognini, supra note 2, at 46–47. Mutual intent is, of course, the
lynchpin of contract.
240. In this sense—if not in others—the Illinois Supreme Court was right in Hewitt.
Implicit contract claims are, in essence, claims for common law marriage, and if a legisla-
ture has abolished common law marriage, it is not clear that courts should reinstitute it
under the guise of implicit contract.
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out regime.
c. Same Wine, New (Contract) Bottles
In implicit contract claims, courts avert their eyes from the sexual con-
duct instead of highlighting it (as courts do in opt-out regimes inquir-
ies241), but there is the same scrutiny of other interpersonal behavior that
conduct-based opt-out regimes require.242 The social norms used to infer
marital-like obligations are, in both instances, marital norms. Why else
would a court infer that Jane Blumenthal agreed to provide post-dissolu-
tion support to Eileen Brewer? Why would Blumenthal make such a
promise? Because married people do. Scholars often assail the way
courts’ evaluation of nonmarital relationships reinforce marital norms,243
but litigants invite that paternalistic evaluation when they ask courts to
infer a contract. From what can a judge infer a contract except from the
marital norms for cohabitation and affective relationships with which he
or she is familiar?244 Just as judges in opt-out regimes assess whether a
given relationship was emotionally and financially interdependent
enough to look like a “good marriage,”245 so a judge must assess the exis-
tence of an implicit contract by looking at whether the behavior of the
parties parallels situations in which parties are legally bound to each
other to the extent alleged in the implicit contract. The vast majority of
those situations involve marriage. Implicit contract doctrine thus reifies
traditional marriage, just as opt-out systems do.
Explicit contract claims, on the other hand, leave parties free to craft
their rights and obligations as they choose. Like opt-in regimes they in-
vite parties to reject the marriage–nonmarriage binary. But they respect a
couple’s autonomy at the possible expense of protecting those made vul-
nerable by relationship. Just as the opt-in systems discussed in Part IV.A
241. In contract claims, sex assumes a reciprocal role to the one it plays in opt-out
conduct-based claims. As discussed previously, in trying to evaluate whether cohabitants
were sufficiently emotionally interdependent to justify imposing marital obligations in an
opt-out regime, courts scrutinize the sexual relationship. In trying to evaluate whether co-
habitants’ relationship included an implicit contract to share their property, courts insist on
ignoring the sexual relationship. That the sex is critical to one doctrine but critically absent
in the other does not likely reflect the role that sex plays in the relationships courts are
evaluating. The importance of sex to a relationship—the extent to which it plays a role in
the parties’ understanding of their rights and obligations to each other—likely varies over
time and situation, and it almost certainly varies by couple. Courts are not well-suited to
deal with that nuance. See supra Part IV.A.2.
242. Notably, Eileen Brewer (possibly using her judicial connections) got the court to
seal the record in her case, ostensibly to protect her children. See Dizikes et al., supra note
211. That she wanted the record to be sealed is an indication of how invasive categorization
costs can be.
243. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 4, at 2689 (“marriage is the measure of all things.
Thus, affective associations that lie outside . . . marriage are evaluated and understood by
virtue of their likeness to, or dissimilarity from, marriage.”); Antognini, supra note 196, at
1892 (citing the “intractable relationship between marriage and nonmarriage”).
244. Recall the promise that Whorton alleged Dillingham made, supra text accompany-
ing notes 224–228. What would make Dillingham promise so much if not the norms of
sharing that infuse family law?
245. See supra note 116.
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often result in parties sharing less than family law would otherwise re-
quire, so enforcement of explicit contract claims—at least plausible
ones—are likely to work to the disadvantage of those with fewer
resources.246
Thus, contract doctrine does not add much to the opt-out/opt-in regime
debate; it repeats it. The costs and benefits of implicit contracts are the
costs and benefits of opt-out systems, including categorization costs and
reification of marital norms. The costs and benefits of express contracts
are the costs and benefits of opt-in systems, including leaving vulnerable
those who may invest most in non-market work, and reifying a neoliberal
non-communitarian system of entitlement.
d. The Grab Bag of Other Equitable Doctrines
Most cohabitants seeking a legal remedy at the end of a cohabiting
relationship also assert some other equitable claims, like restitution, con-
structive trust, or general quantum meruit. These claims posit that one of
the cohabitants was unjustly enriched by the other’s contribution to the
relationship, or the property at issue. Again, the more specific the contri-
bution to a particular piece of property, the greater the likelihood of suc-
ceeding on any particular claim. The more the claim is based on the
totality of the relationship, the harder it is for one to recover. The Court
in Marvin not only failed to award Triola anything in unjust enrichment, it
found that she, not he, had been the one enriched by the relationship.247
Other litigants have gotten more out of unjust enrichment claims, but
those rewards are routinely criticized as too low and too gendered.248
Professor Antognini argues that regardless of the sex of the plaintiff,
“wifely services” are not valued, “while monetary contributions or ser-
vices expended in actually building a home [as opposed to caring for it]
are.”249 Moreover, as Antognini demonstrates, women’s contributions
are routinely categorized as gift, not labor, thus obviating the need for
any valuation.250 Professor Antognini’s insightful reading of nonmarital
cases identifies how much of a problem this is, but the law of equity is not
well suited to solve it. Even if a judge thought a man and woman’s contri-
butions were equal, under unjust enrichment doctrine, if the market does
not reflect that belief, the judge has no basis for valuing the contributions
equally.
246. See Younger, supra note 222, at 358.
247. Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
248. See BOWMAN, supra note 29, at 41–43 (criticizing courts’ tendency to under-reward
in equitable claims and usually only reward if the work performed is “male”).
249. Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Coverture, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2139, 2172–73 (2019).
250. Antognini, supra note 249, at 2173. Turning women’s labor into “love,” is a prob-
lem feminist commentators have long recognized. See generally, Katharine Silbaugh, Turn-
ing Labor Into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 36–45 (examining the
laws in which courts and governmental agencies routinely treat women’s domestic labor as
gift, as opposed to work that should be compensated).
246 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
i. Measuring the Enrichment: Of Comparable Worth, Unique
Labor, and Gift
The measure of unjust enrichment remedies is usually the defendant’s
gain or benefit, not the plaintiff’s loss,251 but neither measure is likely to
pay someone who performs traditionally feminine jobs adequately be-
cause women’s work is notoriously undervalued in the market. For years,
scholars have unearthed how the law of coverture and its remnants
treated women’s domestic and relational investments as lesser, usually
inevitable or gratuitous and certainly not as valuable as men’s.252 But the
market does not do much better. Pink collar workers have always been
paid less than blue collar workers; maids are paid less than garbage col-
lectors; and grade school teachers are paid less than high school teachers
and college professors. These disparities are what gave rise to calls for
comparable worth reform.253
How should one value the work that Michelle Triola performed while
cohabiting with Lee Marvin? What did Jane Blumenthal receive from Ei-
leen Brewer in the twenty-six years they were together? For sure, there is
value in what these women did but putting a monetary figure on it is
extremely difficult, and it opens the door to counterarguments. Dr. Blu-
menthal might well have argued that her greater monetary contribution
to the household allowed Brewer to pursue a more meaningful and flexi-
ble job as a government lawyer and judge, a position Brewer may well
have preferred to a more lucrative, but more draining and less satisfying,
private law practice.254 As a judge, Brewer also earned the right to collect
a generous pension for the rest of her life, a pension that she might have
had to share with Blumenthal if they had been married and then
divorced.255
Contemporary family law avoids asking courts to evaluate who was
more enriched by how much by simply dividing what is there in half,
251. DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Res-
titution 215 (3d ed. 2018) (“To measure damages, courts look at plaintiff’s loss or injury. To
measure restitution, courts look at defendant’s gain or benefit, and not plaintiff’s loss.”).
252. See generally, NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE
NATION 54 (2000) (explaining how women’s domestic labor was necessarily considered
part of the marital bargain and not subject to independent evaluation); Reva B. Siegel, The
Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Right to Earnings, 1860–1930, 82
GEO. L.J. 2127, 2131 (1994); Silbaugh, supra note 249, at 35 (discussing how the law resists
counting women’s labor as labor); HASDAY, supra note 19, at 92 (family law assumes and
enforces women’s altruism).
253. See Jone Johnson Lewis, Comparable Worth: Equal Pay for Work of Equal Value,
THOUGHTCO, https://www.thoughtco.com/comparable-worth-pay-equity-3529471 [https://
perma.cc/95HR-3Z8U] (last updated Jul. 24, 2019) (“Comparable worth is shorthand for
‘equal pay for work of equal value’ or ‘equal pay for work of comparable worth.’ The
doctrine of ‘comparable worth’ is an attempt to remedy the inequities of pay which result
from a long history of sex-segregated jobs and different pay scales for ‘female’ and ‘male’
jobs. Market rates, in this view, reflect past discriminatory practices, and cannot be the
only basis of deciding current pay equity.”).
254. See supra note 221.
255. Id.
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whether it be property or post-dissolution income stream.256 That is what
the family law move from discretion to formulae allowed and required.
What one is entitled to is not a function of the work one actually per-
formed, or why one performed it or how much it is worth in a market, but
the fact of belonging to the family unit. What one is obligated to pay is
not a function of what one received, but what one can pay.
As a matter of family law, the person who helps maintain the house, by
cleaning and furnishing it, is entitled to just as much as the person who
built it.257 The person who provides the emotional support for the family
is entitled to just as much as the person who provides the physical sup-
port. Making dinner and mowing the lawn are treated the same way, re-
gardless of who did what job. Those who mock the idea that the law treats
the family as the market’s opposite258 often fail to acknowledge how that
perspective allows family law a means of removing women’s work from
traditional market analysis. Family law remedies avoid the comparable
worth problem.
The non-market-based approach to entitlement and obligation is par-
ticularly important in family law because so much of the work performed
in affective relationships is unique. There are many jobs that only a per-
son in the affective relationship can do. The value of the work stems from
the relationship that the provider of the care has to the person receiving
it. One cannot ask Google to find someone to provide emotional support
after a rough day, or to accompany a sibling to a chemotherapy appoint-
ment, or to attend a family funeral, or to eat breakfast with a child. These
are the kinds of investments that cohabitants and family members make
all the time. They have enormous social and individual value, but they
have no market value because there is no demand for them outside the
particular relationship.
Family law solves the problem of how to value unique contributions the
same way it solves the problem of how to define entitlement and obliga-
tion, by taking all that is there and splitting it in two. This results in plenty
of what, in market contexts, we might call inequities. The spouse who
never took care of her father-in-law is entitled to just as much as the
spouse who did. The wealthy spouse who paid others to do vast amounts
of childcare is paid more than a less wealthy parent who did all the child-
care herself. Individual desert has no relevance in family law.
Finally, as Gregg Strauss has thoughtfully explained, family law’s sta-
256. Maintenance rarely divides post-marital income in half, but formulas do base the
amount awarded on a set amount of the collective joint income, usually no more than 40%
of the combined income. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/504 (West 2018) (the appli-
cable Illinois maintenance statute in Blumenthal).
257. Thus, the problem that Professor Antognini identifies with courts refusing to value
“wifely services”—defined as caring for the home or rearing children—is much less an
issue at the dissolution of a union in family law. See Antongnini, supra note 249, at
2172–73.
258. See supra notes 185–186 and accompanying text.
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tus-based entitlement system reduces the gift problem.259 Professor
Antognini rightfully deplores how courts far too readily assume that the
labor women perform is gratuitous. But for many—probably most—rela-
tionships, whether they be marital or not, a huge amount of what one
gives in relationship is gift with no expectation of compensation. Love
ceases to be love if it is given and received within a market framework.
Disproportionate gift-giving, feeling as if one has given more than the
other, is one of the risks one always assumes in relationship, whether it be
platonic or conjugal. The ability to exit the relationship is what allows one
to minimize the damage from a bad risk. To suggest that the law must
protect against, or prevent, people from assuming that risk in the first
place would substantially alter our understandings of what relationships
are.
2. Summary
The numerous contemporary calls to recognize nonmarital families,
kinship structures, and cohabiting couples likely stem from the recogni-
tion that these relationships are different from market relationships. They
are marked by a different set of norms, norms that include giving without
a clear expectation of compensation. As Robin West observes, we are
praised at home for not profit-maximizing, for being less individualis-
tic.260 What makes nonmarital families, kinship structures, and cohabiting
couples a subject of so much concern is that they operate according to
non-market norms, yet without family law’s help. Contract doctrine and
restitutionary doctrine can provide some redress for people who invest in
these relationships without family status, but the nature of relational in-
vestment and the non-market norms that pervade such relationships,
make it unlikely that legal doctrines that rely on market measures will
provide effective relief.
VI. CONCLUSION
As noted in Part II, there are over 18 million people in the United
States who live together but are not married. For decades, the law pro-
fessed little concern for these couples because, the thought was, ignoring
them would eventually channel them into marriage and family law’s sta-
tus-based system. However effective this channeling function may have
once been, it no longer works. The number of cohabitants continues to
grow. The hard question is what, if anything, the law should do about
that.
This Article has provided a taxonomy of the costs and benefits associ-
ated with the current alternatives to family law’s status-based system.
Opt-out, conduct-based systems reject gendered market-based measures
259. See Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial Defense of
Legal Marriage Based on the Structure of Intimate Duties, at 22 (Spring 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (published with revisions, supra note 199).
260. WEST, supra note 32, at 92.
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of recovery and impose communitarian obligations on cohabitants, but
they require invasive judicial inquiries and they may conscript those who
can least afford and have legitimate reasons to reject communitarian obli-
gations. Those opt-out systems that are triggered by time or children fail
to appreciate how many people who cohabit, especially low-income wo-
men, value their autonomy and parental relationships more than their
conjugal ones. The arguments presented here suggest that to avoid cate-
gorization costs and to respect individuals’ autonomy, opt-out systems
should be triggered by time, not conduct, but substantial amounts of time.
Two to five years seems like far too short a time to trigger mutual obliga-
tions, and the presence of children does not change that analysis.
Opt-in registration systems disrupt family law’s binary status system
and respect the autonomy of those who do not want family law imposed
on them against their wishes, but they run the risk of leaving those left
vulnerable by the interdependencies of relationships with nothing. They
also undermine the communitarian norms of family law. If policy makers
want to protect those communitarian norms while simultaneously honor-
ing individuals’ desire not to marry, they should make sure that opt-in
regimes include communitarian nonmarital choices—though, to date,
when given a nonmarital communitarian choice, most people reject it and
opt instead for a neoliberal individualistic regime.
Finally, contract solutions end up paralleling opt-out and opt-in sys-
tems, depending on whether the claim sounds in implicit or explicit con-
tract; and unjust enrichment claims inevitably incorporate market-based
neoliberal understandings of desert and reward because that is what equi-
table doctrines use to assign value. There is little to no justification for
courts’ refusal to use these doctrines in claims between cohabitants, but
there is also little reason to assume that these doctrines will protect those
who invest in relationships as robustly as does family law’s communitar-
ian regime.
This taxonomy of alternatives helps highlight the benefits of family
law’s status-based system. Treating status as determinative and relying on
the formulaic approach that has overtaken family law in the last twenty-
five years allows courts to avoid invasive moralistic inquiries into parties’
financial and sexual relationships. It removes questions of entitlement
from the market and the individualistic neoliberal approach to rights and
obligation that predominate in other areas of law. It treats family law as
the market’s opposite in ways that inure to the benefit of those who have
performed the affective, emotional, and unique work of relationship.
As the law moves to address the perceived needs of those who do that
work without family law status, policymakers will be well served by evalu-
ating the categorization costs of administering alternative systems, weigh-
ing the relative weight of values like autonomy and communitarianism,
and considering how we may benefit from viewing the family as the mar-
ket’s opposite.
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